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Abstract
Teaching the nature of science is oflen justified as a means of incrc"1.sill~ sltu,k'nts'
intellectual independence, critical thinking skills. and scientific literacy. This Ihesi.~
examines the soundness of these justificalions in light of argullIenls from Hanlwig
(1985, 1991), Polanyi (1946), and Code (1987) concerning the role of trust in .sl·iencl"
the existence of scientific epistemic communities. and the epislcmic depcmkllec Ill'
laypeople and scientists alike on other scientists.
Various methods for teaching the nature of science are cKamincd in mdcr III Sl'C
what scientific epistemologies are espoused by lhcm, and whethcr a mcans fur ~tllaininl!
intellectual independence is provided by lhem. This analysis illustrate.s that approaches
to teaching the nature of science espouse epistemologies lhal arc hased 1111
experimentalion and lhe analysis of evidence and reasons for sdcntilic knuwkdgc. I
have concluded that, in many cases, sludents arc not able to analYl_e lhe reasons <11111
evidence that support scicnlific knowledge claims, and complete inlcllccttlOll
independence is often not attainable. The level of independence all.'1.in:tblc i.s uftcn
limited to an independent judgement of the degree of certainty of a knowlt'(lgc claim.
That is, while being epislemically dependent on the expcrts for the reasons lhal supJXlrl
scientific knowledge claims, students can judge lhallhcsc knowlcdgcclaimsarc lcnt:ltive
and subject 10 revision, In this way, a critical disposition towards scientific knowledgc.
but not an ability to think critically about the evidence for or against claims to
knowledge, is encouraged.
Finally, I address three implications for science education of the fact that laypeople
and scientists arc epistcmically dependcnI. First, a more accurate scicntific
epistcmology thai rcnccls both knowledgc generation and knowledge acquisition needs
to be taught. Second, students should be taught to acknowlet:lge their epistemic
dependencc, and be encouraged and given grounds to trust the products of science.
Third, scicnceedueation should stress scientific ethics, since tnlst plays such a large role
in scientific knowledge generation and acquisition.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Tcaching the nature of science is a long standing goal of science education. The
justifications for teaching the nature of science include increasing students' intellectual
independence. critical thinking skills, and scielltific lite",cy. However. strong
arguments from Hardwig (1985, 1991), Polanyi (1946), and Code (1987) concerning the
mlc of trust in science, the e!tistence of scientific epistemic communities, and the
epistcmic dependence of scientists on their colleagues provide grounds for questioning
thcscjUSlifications for teaching the nature of science. This thesis examines whether Ihe
justifications arc sound.
I examine various methods for teaching the nature of science in order to see what
scientific epistemologies arc espoused by them, and whether a means for attaining
intellectual independence is provided by them. This analysis concludes that the various
approaches to teaching Ihe nature of science espouse epistemologies that are bast<! on
experimentation and the analysis of evidence and reasons for scientific knowledge. I
have concluded that, in many cases, students arc not able to analyze the reasons and
evidf.'1lce that support scientific knowledge claims, and complete intellectual
independence is often not attainable. The level of independence attainable is often
Iimitcd to an independent judgement of thc degree of certainty of a knowledge claim.
Thai is. while being epistemically dependent on the expertS for the reasons that support
scientific knowledge claims. students can judge that these knowledge claims are tentative
and subject to revision. In this way. a critical disposition towards scientific knowledge.
but not an ability to think critically about the evidence for or agaimt claims In
knowlerlge. is encouraged.
Finally, r address three implications for science education of tile factth:ltlayr1copic
and scientists are epistemically dependent. First. a more accurate scicntilil'
epistemology that reflects both knowledge generation and knowledge acquisition llCl'(ls
to bc taught. Second. students should be taught to acknowledge lheir epislclllk
dependence, and be encouraged and given grounds to trust the producls uf science,
Third, science education should stress scientific ethics, since trust plays such a largc rule
in scientific knowledge generation and acquisition.
This study is motivated by the renewed and widespread intcrcst bcing .~hnwn in
teaching the nature of science. Recently. instruction in the nature of ~cicncc ha.~
provoked the interest of educators at all levels, In 1989. the Firstlntcrnatimllli History
and Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching conference was held in Florida, Thi.~
conference produced 124 papers that were published in six special is,~ucs or juurn;tl.~ unil
two books (Gruender & Tobin, 1991), This interest was continued wilh the Sccond
International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Conrerence hcld in Kingston.
Ontario. in 1992,
In Canada, interest in Ih'~ goal of teaching the nalure of science is eyident in other
ways. The Science Council of Canada has published seven discussion papers designed
to stimulate debate on the goals of school science. Five deal with topics that arc
discussed in this thesis: Science in Social Issues (Aikenhead, 1980),~~
~ (Munby, 1982), Maeroscale' A Holistic Approach to Science Teachin" (Risi,
1982), Scientific Literaw Towards Balance in Selling Goals for School Science
~ (Robcrls, 1983), and EpistemolQgy and the Teaching of Science (Nadeau &
Desautels, 1984).
In Newfoundland and Labrador, at least two high school science courses include
objectivcs that deal explicitly with the nature of science. Chcmistry 2202 devotes unit
onc to teaching aspects of the nature of scicnce, inclUding discussions on the nature of
scicntifk ohservalion and progress in scicnce. An objective dealing with teaChing the
nature of science has been added to the Physics 2204 curriculum. Specific indicators
of this gcneral objective include students being able to identify acceptable and
unacceptable views of science, as well as discuss the role of theories and tentativeness
in scicnce. A high school course on science, lechnology and society is being developed,
and is being piloted in Newfoundland and Labrador.
Thus. on international, national, and provincial levels, teaching the nature of science
is provoking interest and concern as a goal of science education. With the magnitude
of interest being shown in understanding the nature of science as a goal of science
education. it is important that the justifications for it are sound.
Outline of the Thesjs
There are five subsequent chapters in thisthcsis. In chaplcr two, evidence is given
for the assertions that teaching the nature of science is a long-standing go.,1 uf science
teaching, and that it is onen justified as a means for increasing students' intdlcctu;\1
independence, critical thinking abilities, and scicntific literacy. Studenls. aner
instruction in the nature of science. should be able to analy7.c the evidencc ami rcaSlIl1.~
that support scientific knowledge claims so that they can asscss the suundness of the
claims on thE.'irown.
In chaprer three. I argue that scientific epistemology must acknowledge lhe rule of
testimony and trust in acquiring scientific knowledge. Replication, alllithc analysis of
evidence and reasons, are no! always the means of acquiring scientific knowlI.'ilge hy
scientists or laypcople.
In chapter four, due to inconsistencies between the contentions of chapters \wu and
three, I conclude thai there is a need to examine approaches to teaching the nature {If
science and the justifications for them based on the promotion of intellectual
independence and critical thinking. Three approaches to teaching the nature of science.
leaching the history of scicnce, using laboratory activities, and teaching the philusophy
of science, are ellamined. The analysis focuses on the scientific epislclI\ologic.~ thaI arc
espoused by each approach, as well as on how cach approach purports \II encourage
intellectual independence and critical thinking skills in students.
In chapler five. expectations about the degree of intellectual independence to he
attained from instruction in lhe nature of science are juxtaposed with the degree of
epistemic dependence of scientists and laypeople on other scientists. It is concluded that
students may, with instruction in the nature of science, achieve a limited level of
independence with respect to judging the degree of certainty of scientific knowledge
claims, and acquire a critical disposition toward scientific knOWledge. However,
complete intellectual independence and the ability to think critically about the evidence
for scientific knowledge claims are not attained from instruction in the nature of science.
In chapler six, implications for instruction in the nature of science are addressed.
Instruction in the nature of science should acknowledge lhe role of testimony in
scientific knowledge generation and acquisition, and distinguish knowledge acquisition
from knowledge generation and justification. Students should be encouraged to
acknowledge their own epislemic dependence on scientists, and to trust (rather than to
be overly sceptical) the products of scientists. Finally, the need for instruction in
scientific ethics is advanced.
ChapterTw(I
Teaching the Nature of Science
and Intellectual Independence
In this chapter, I first will establish that the goal of understanding the nature {If
science in science education is prevalent among those interested in science education.
Three approaches to teaching the nature of science are discussed, and a brief review of
some empirical research is given, so that the prevalence of this goal in science Cllucatinn
is established. Second, I establish that this goal is justified as a means of illcrc:lsing
students' intellectual independence, critical thinking, scientific literacy, andlor abililie.~
to understand and assess the reasons and evidence for scientific knowledge claims.
However, these apparently sound justifications arc opposCll in the next chapler hy Cll,iHl.~
of inevitable epistemic dependence of others on ;;dentists. In light of these cillims, thc
justifications for teaching the nature of science arc c<llied into queslion.
The Nature of Science 3$ a Goal of Science Edl~
In this section, I will establish that teaching lhe nature of science is a long-standing
goal of science education. Over Ihe years, this goal consistcnlly h:IS remained ,IS :m
objective of science curriculum. In recent years, with increasingly complcx
technological advances and abstract scientific theories, teaching the limits of science and
scientists, as well as imparting critical abilities 10 students, have become rod for science
education. These emphases have caused a resurgence of interest in teaching the nature
of science. This goal of science education is ingrained in how science courses are
taught, and in scientific literature.
In chapter olle, an indication of the high level of recent interest in the nature of
science as a goal of science education is documented. A review of the literature reveals
that this goal was envisioned much earlier. In the late 1800's, Ernst Mach was a strong
advocate of students' understanding about science. Matthews (990) examines Mach's
early contribution to science education (which will be examined in chapter three of this
thesis) and conclUdes, "His major edu<:ational themes have a great deal of contemporary
relevance, particularly as science education strives to see how history and philosophy
of science can be best utilized in the classroom and the curricula" (p. 324).
In an extensive review of the research dealing with students' and teachers'
conceptions of the nature of science, Lederman (1992) traces the history of this goal in
scicnce education. He finds that "concerns for the development of adequate
understanding of the nature of science have worn many hats through the years" (p. 332).
In 1907. reports of the Central Association of Science and Mathematics Teachers
presented strong arguments for increasing the emphasis in science education <Ill the
scientific method and the processes of science. In the 1960's, during a period of
increased science curriculum development in the post-Sputnik years, the goal of
increasing students' understanding of Ihe nature of science was expressed in tcrms of an
emphasis on scientific process and inquiry (Welch, 1979), while, more recently, the goal
has I>ccn expressed in terms of increasing students' scientific literacy (American
Association for the Advancement of Science. 1989; National Scicncc TC;lchcrs
Association. 1982).
Thus, increasing studer.ts· underSlanding of the nature of science. by one lIlC;lnS tlr
another, has been consistently a goal of science education for over onc hundred ye;lr.~.
Lederman (1992) notes that, in spite of Ihe lack of conscnsus on the content !;\llghl in
science courses,
there appears to be strong agreement on at least one of the objectives of scicnce
instruction. The development of an 'adequate understanding of thc IlatufC of
science' or an understanding of 'science as a way of knowing' continucs to hc
convincingly advocated as a desired outcome of science instruction. (p. 3.11)
Methods of Teaching the Nature of Science.
The prevalence of the goal of teaching lhe nature of science is also made cvitlclII hy
the variety of approaches thai are employed in teaching it. The use of the history of
science, laboratory activities, and the philosophy of science arc threc such arrm:lche.\.
One of the earliest approaches for I~ching the naturc of scicnce i.~ the U."C ur the
history of science. In the early 1900's, Mach used the history of science in his tcaching
and textbooks, such as The history and rool of the principle of the conservalillll of
~ (Mach, 1911). This approach has been followed in more recent curriculum
developments. A curriculum called "History of Scir-nce Cases for High SChtKlls"
(Klopfer & Cooley. 1963) was found to increase significantly students' scores un the
Tcst on Understanding Scicl\CC (TOUS) (Klopfer & Cooley, 1961), and the history of
science has l>cen integrated into many science curricula to date.
Curricula have been developed using the laboratory as a means of increasing
students' conceptions of the nature of science. In the early 1960's. curriculum projects
such as CHEM Study and Biological Science Curriculum Study (BSCS) focused on
promoting inquiry and proccss skills. Student experimentation in scieocc laboratories
has remained a part of science curricula ever since.
A third method that is used to increase students' conceptions of the nature of
science is teaching, or implicitly imparting. a philosophy of science. This is donc, for
the most pari, by integrating philosophical statements about science throughout the text
or in discussions. and is usually confined to topics such as thc scientific method and
tentativeness in scicnce. As interest in the goal of increasing studcnts' conceptions of
the nature of science increases. perhaps curriculum developers will put more emphasis
on this approach. In Newfoundland and Labrador, the Chemistry 2202 course devotes
a whole unit solely to philosophical discussions about science. However, the objectives
and appendiCils that cover this unit are in the curriculum guide for teachers; the student
textbook for the course does not adequately treat the subject.
Summary of Empirical Research on the Nature of Science
Evidence of interest in the goal of teaching the nature of science has also been
reflected in the amount of educational research on this topic. Early studies thaI
III
attempted to measure students' and teachers' cooccptiolls or the n;llurc or 5Ciene'\: haYe
repor1ed consistently low scores on instruments developed for this purpose (AndI'11t111.
1950; Carey &. Stauu, 1968; Kimball, 1968: Miller. 1963: Schmidt, 1967). 1~lcr
studies tried to identify some of the misconceptions thai Sludents AAd lcachm had abt"llli
the nature of science. One of the most common findings w<u lhe misconception l\f
scientific knowledge as absolute (Aguirre. Haggcny &. Linder. 1990; Ii.'\dy, 1919;
Behnke, 1961; Mackay. 1971: Rubba, Homer &Smilh. 1981). Misconceptions ;lllllhcr
areas were also identified, including those concerning the role of theories in scicntilic
research (Mackay, 1971; Tarnir, 1972).
Recent research in Ihis field has yielded some interesting rc5uhs. II was thuught
that students' conceptions of the nature of science were inadequate as a result (If thcir
teachers' inadequate views. However, recent ~reh is questioning this il..."UlIllltiIlU.
This research indicate5that teachers' views of the naturcof scicnec nJay not be rcnl'CIl'd
in what theytcaeh. or the way they teach, and do not correlate with their studcnL'i' pins
in understanding about the nature of scie1cc. Brickhouse (1989) found that one out of
the three teachers whom she observed engaged in classroom practices thai were /'Inl
consistent with their beliefs. Duschl and Wrighl (1989) found thai the nature of scil'llce
was not being taught to students due 10 teachers' perceptions of studenls needs, and
feelings of accountability with respect to teaching thc objcelivc.~ as sllIled in lhe
curriculum guide. Lederman and Drugcr{1985j found norclation:Jlip between tCilcllcrs'
scores on the Nalure of Scientific Knowledge Scale (Rubba, 19771 and tllcir students'
mean change in SCOre on the same instrument after a period of instructiun. 'I1Il1S,
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leachers' conceptions of the nature of science do not translate as often as we mighllikc
into their classroom practice, tile content of what they teach, or thciT students'
conceptions of the nature of science. However, Zeidler and Lederman (1989) iodie*<!
Ihat teachers' language, independently of how accurately it tP.nected their beliefs about
Ihe nature of science. didcorrclatc significantly wilh their students' scores on the Nature
of Scientific Knowledge SCale (Rubba, 1977).
Thus, the amount and prominence of educational research into students' and
tcachcrl;' conceptions of the nature of science over the last 50 years indicates the value
placed on this goal in science education. The low scores of both teachers and students
on instruments designed \0 measure their conceplions. as well as the pre....alence of
misconceptions in this area, may pro .... ide some of the motivation for the current interest
in this goal.
Intellectual Jndeoendence as a Justification for
Teaching the Nature of Science
In the last section, the prevalence of the goal oftcaching the nature of science was
cstablished. In lhis section, it will be demonstrated lhat justifications for teaching the
nature of science include the justification of increasing students' intellectual
indepcneence with respect to scientific knowledge claims. In chapter four of this thesis,
methods for teaching the nature of science will be examined to sec whether this
justification is sound.
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'!'eaching the nature of science oflen has been justified in par! as a mc<ms llf
fostering intellectual independence. Other ways of expressing Ihis justilic<llion fur
leaching the nature of science include claims of increasing students' scientjfic likracy.
their ability to assess the soundness of scientific knowledge or theories. their crilicill
thinking abilities, or providing a model of a scientific ·way of knowing~ in which
knowledge can be confirmed or verified for oneself.
Munby (1971, March), in describing leaching strategies \0 promote inlcllcclu;ll
independence, defines intellectual independence as follows:
An individual can be said 10 be intellectually independent when he has <111 lhe
resources necessary for judging the truth of a knowledge c1<lim indcpcndcnlly
of olher people.,. If, for lack [of) one or more of the condi,i{)n.~ nCl.:cssary ror
lntellectuallndependcncc, an individual is obligctllo rely upon someone else's
authority, then it is said that the first individual is intellectually dependent U{klll
the second. (p. 6)
Science teachers, he asserts, must:
analyze teaching to see if means for dctcrmining truth arc matle evidenl to
students in order that they can betler assess the truth of staterncn\.~ rur
themselves... when teaching contains this information it moyes decidedly
toward providing for Intellectual Independencc, (p. 10)
Siegel (1989), defines a criticallhinker as a person who is appropriately mnved hy
reasons. In his view, sciencc education can foster critical thinking if it focuses nn the
philosophy of science:
13
Philosophy of science takes as ils subject maller a variety of issues and
questions relevant to the nature, role, and assessmtnl of reasons in
sciencc...Studying philosophy of science, therefore, may contribute powerfully
\0 the understanding of reasons in science, and so to the fostering of critical
thinking in science. (p. 30)
Aikenhead (1990), in a similar vein, views a scicl1tc education that focuses on the
reasons supporting scientific kt:owledge claims as one that foslers intellectual
indc~ndcncc. He asserts, "To be intellectually independent is to asses~, on one's own,
the soundness of the justification proposed for a knowledge claim. Intellectual
independence is an explicit goal for science education" (p. 132).
Duschl (1990) distinguishes between leaching scientific knOWledge and teaching
knowledge aDout science by writing:
In a knowledge-about·science curriculum the interactions among science,
technology, and society are much more relevant and thus are more easily
appreciated. It aUcmpts '0 stress the mm1 important content, to introduce the
guiding conceptions of science, and 10 establish in learners the ability to
evaluate the legitimacy of knowledge claims. (p. 10)
Dusch! recognizes the growing complexity of science, and argues that one
instructional unit that focuses on the context of discovery should be included in the
science curriculum so that students understanding will be enhanced:
As Ihe processes of science used in gathering and evaluating scientific evidence
become more sophisticated, the need to establish a curriculum that examines
14
the chain of reasoning that has brought us (0 this point gains in imponanC\:.
(1990. p.ll)
Gagne (1965) justified teaching lhc procc:sscs of science as a means of inCl\.'il5illg
a student's ability to understand any scientist's experimental work. Arter iI student has
been laught the processes of science
a scientist should be able 10 tell this student what he (the scientist) is studying.
and the techniques he is using, and what he has found. in a relatively hricr
fashion, and have the student display a rather profound unuerstanding uf it
immediately. (p. 5)
Even as the goal of teaching the nature of science was being initialed intn st:kncc
curriculum. Mach (1943) was justifying teaching the hislory of science as .. mc.ms III'
making students more independent:
A person who has read and understood the Greek and Roman authors has fcll
and eJ[perienced more than one who is restricted 10 Ihc impressiOlt5 of the
present. He sees how men placed in dirrerent cireumstancc.o; judge quite
differently of the same things from what we do to'"day. His own judgemClll'i
will be rendered thus more independent. (p.347)
Many others have justified teaching the nature of science as a means til increasing
students' abilities independently to evaluate knowledge claims. The above review
provides evidence that this justification is long-st1nding and well c...tahlishcd in
educational literature.
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This chapter provides evidence that teaching the nature of science is well established
as a goal of science education. Advocates for teaching the nature of science justify it
:IS a means of increasing students' intellectual independence, critical thinking skills,
andlor scientific literacy. Students, by understanding how science progresses, how
scientists generate scientific knowledge claims, and by analyzing Ihe evidence and
reasons that support scientific knowledge claim~. arc, according to Ihe views espoused
in this chapter, better ahle to evaluate and assess the soundness of scientific knowledge
claims lhat may be made.
This is contrary to the views put forth in Ihe next chapler. It is asserted by several
writers that trust, reliance on testimony, and the infrequence of scientific replication are
characteristics of science that point to the inability, and even inappropriateness. of
teaching students to bccome intellectually independent. Thus, any justifications for
teaching lite nature of science as a means orencouraging intellectual independence need
10 be reevaluated.
ChapterThrcc
Epistemic Dependence and Trust in Science
We have seen that leaching the nature of science consistently has been a go.d IIf
science education, and that it is orten justified as a means of inerca.'1ing stlldenl~'
intellectual independence, critical thinking skills, and abilities 10 cvalualc and assess the
soundness of scientific knowledge e1aims.
These justifications would be called into qucstion, howcver, if arguments hy
Hardwig (1985, 1991), Code (1987), Harr~ (1986), I'olanyi (1946), and Brood and Wade
(1982) are accepted. While each of these writcrs emphasizes a different aspect IIr
science, the overall theme is one of interdependence among scientists, wilh .'iCicntific
knowledge being acquired from other scientists through testimony. Hardwig (19KS.
1991) asserts that. as a result of this, all people, including scientisls, arc inc.'ICftpahly
epistemically dependent on others for their knowledge. The implication, Hardwig
claims, is that trust in Olhers is involved centrally in science.
Each section of this chapter will examine ways in which scierltisu more acetln.tely
are depicted as being part of a large scientific community, where scientific knowlctlgc
is often acquired through testimony and trust, not by replication of experiments or hy
analysis of reasons and evidence. Chapter four will then examine appmachcs til
teaching the nature of science 10 sec whether the justification of increasing sludenl~'
intellectual independence is, in fact, realistic, in light of the epistcmic interdependence
that is necessarily a pan ofscicnee.
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Scientific Ways of Knowing
"Trust", "morals", "ethicsn ....od ·valucs· are words often not used in discussing
the acquisition of scientific knowledge claims. More than likely, the words used would
include "objective" t "proof". "evidence", and "rational", However, in many stages of
science, from students learning science from their teachers, to a science specialist
reading about a new scientific development in ajou~al or newspaper, trust is implicit,
and the morals, ethics, and values of scientists form the basis of that trust.
Epistemological accounts of the ways of knowing rarely mention the reliance all
testimony, and the necessity of trust on the part of the knowledge seeker. Commenting
On this point, Code (1987) remarks:
The knowledge seeker is conceived of as a solitary being; from Plato's
insistence upon the incommunicability of knowledge of the Forms, through
Descartes' certainty, to Russell's emphasis upon the primacy of knowledge by
acquaintance. Nol only are human beings taken to be independent in cognitive
endeavors. but it is contended that cognitive independence is a desirable
condition. The underlying assumption is that even knowledge that might, for
one knower, be quite good knowledge must inevitably be diluted, denatured,
or reduced to opinion when it is conveyed to, or acquired from, another
person. Testimony is commonly taken to be of a lesser order of knowledge
than knowledge at first hand, and a poor substitute for it. (p.167)
"
Whether we like it or not, we are onen forced to trust somcooe else's tcstimony
about scientific knowledge. Knowledge acquired through testimony, however. need not
be a negative thing. In fact, once lhe pervasiveness and necessity for knl,lwlt..'dll~
acquired in such a manner is realized, then the role of trust can be put in a nlOfI.'
favourable perspective,
Philosopheo: of science have long argued that evidence and reason form the Imsis
of scientific knowledge; trust usually is nol acknowledged as playing a role. Positivistic
philosophies of science that rose to prominence as a result of Ernst Mach and the Vicnna
Circle demanded lhal only observable phenomena be accepted as scicnlitic knowledge;
other less stringent philosophies have required that scientific knowledge be 1c.~lablc or
falsifiable using experimental evidence. More rccc!1tly. in arguing for the rnlionalily
of science, in contradiction to Kuhn's (1%2) incommensurability-of-theories thesis.
Siegel (1989) suggested that scientific method should be regarded as a commitment tn
evidence. The epistemology of science has always focused on such things as scientific
method, formal and informal logic, scientific proof. reasons for theory-choicc. allli
interpreting evidence. In short, descriptions of the ways of knowing in science have
focused almost exclusively on the generation and justification of scientific knowledge
claims.
Scientists, then, in order to claim to know scientilic knowledge claims according
to this traditional epistemology, would have to reproduce the expcrimentill wurk III
verify the claim for themselves. Perhaps, scientisb :ould claim to know the knowledge
claims by examining other scientists' records of data without performing the actual
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experiments. by determining what interpretations were made, and by verifying for
themselves that the knowledge claims are justified. In both of these ways of knowing,
the reasons, evidence andjustilications for knowledge claims would have 10 be analyzed.
But can scientists claim to know a scientific knowledge claim without actually
confirming the knowledge claim for themselves? If the answer to this is no, then
scientists, in order to claim to know scientific knowledge claims, must verify for
themselves each resull that they are going to use before pursuing their own interests.
Obviously, scientists do not do this, and (or good reason: science would never progress
if scientists had to start from scratch, verifying each resuilleading to their own area of
inquiry. But it is not just a matter of inadequate time; in using the results of fields
outside their own area of expertise "they do not feel called upon, or even competent,
to test these results themselves. Scientists must rely heavily for their facts on the
authority they acknowledge their fellow scientists to have" (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).
The second way to know, in which the evidence and reasons for a knowledge claim
arc analYZed without actually r~rrr...ducing the actual experiment, poses similar problems.
Scientists could never know all the evidence and reasons for all previous knowledge
claims. Much of the evidence would be outside of their area of expertise, and they
would not be capable, in all cases, of understanding what counts as good reasons or of
interpreting the data of various instruments. Hardwig (1985) argues that in these
situations it is irrational 10 think for oneself: "rationality sometimes consists in deferring
to epistemic authority" (p. 343), since "if I were to pursue epistemic autonomy across
the board, I would succeed only in holding relatively uninformed, unreliable, crude,
'0
untested, and therefore irrational beliefs" (p. 340). The magnitude of knowkdgc Ihal
would need to be verified or analyzed before the individual could claim to knuw is
prohibitive. Scientists have neither the time nor the competence \0 verify or analyze the
evidence and reasons for all scientific knowledge claims.
The Education of a Scientist
So how do prospective scientists learn their science? Are all the cxpcril1\cnl.~ Ih:ll
form the foundation of our scientific knOWledge 10 be performed by students before they
accept the knowledge as confirmed? Are Ihey to be critical of all new knowledge lilught
them? Polanyi (1946) descril>cs the process by which apprentice scientists gain scicnlilk
knowledge and practical experience from their leachers. These beginning scientists lIlUM
trust their teachers and learn the premises of sciencc by submitting to lheir leachers'
authority:
At every stage of his progress towards this end he is urged on by the belief thaI
cenain things as yet beyond his knowledge and evcn undcrSlanding arc on the
whole true and valuable, so that it is worth spending his most intcnsive cfforts
on mastering them. This represents a recognition of the authority of thaI which
he is going to learn and of those from whom he is going to learn it, (p. 45)
Kuhn has written about the necessity of a ccrtain amount of dogmatism in science
education. In order to solve the puzzles posed by normal scicncc, scicntists must accept
without question certain fundamental beliefs of currcnt scicntific paradigms. Working
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within the confines of the existing paradigms, normal scientists do research 10 expand
the amount and depth of scientific knowledge that can be generated by the paradigms.
As more research is done using these paradigms, anomalies, or experimental results,
that do not support the paradigms arise. When these anomalies accumulate 10 the extent
thaI they no longer can be ignored, a crisis period ensues, and science enters a period
of revolution. New paradigms arc proposed that may have different underlying
assumptions than the old paradigm, and may be incommensurable in that they cannot be
compared in a neutral way. Once the new paradigms are accepted, a new peT~od of
normal science ensues, in Which, once again, the underlying assumptions are
unquestioned by normal scientists, and new scientific knowledge is generated. It is up
to the teacher, Kuhn has written, to prepare students to become normal scientists,
uncritical of the existing paradigm, in order to increase the amount of scientific
knowledge that can be generated by the existing paradigms.
Norris (1990) argues that students have no access to direct evidence for many
propositions that they are taught. Instead of questioning the actual reasons and evidence
for the propositions, he suggests that the students analyze the grounds for their belief
in the propositions. If their belief is grounded in the recognition of experts, like the
author of a chemistry texthook, then the belief can constitute a rational trust. Norris
asserts: "if college students are not willing to rationally trust, then I am not sure how
they can get by in the world" (p. 238).
Thus, there are many scientific knowledge claims that students must accept on the
basis of authority. They have neither the means nor the ability to analyze or understand
the evidence or reasons for many scientific knOWledge claims. They arc 1:Jr.1)\..'Ch:U !II
trust their teachers and textbooks, and learn the underlying assumptions. methodology.
and standards of the current paradigms.
Teamwork in Science
It is not just the magnitude of scientific knowledge being generated that lIIake~ it
impossible for one person to verify all of it. Much scientific research takes years Itl
complete, and employs teams of scientists. Hardwig (1985) reports on one such
research project that determined the lifetime of charm particles. The equipment needcd
to do the experiment took 50 person/years to construct; the actual data eolk.'Ctiul1. which
involved SO physicists, took another SO person/years; and one of the five gmllps lining
the analysis of the data took 60 person/years and 40 physicists to complete their part jlf
the analysis. Every person involved had their own special role in the project; not one
person knew all the evidence or rationale for the whole project; not one could do <til the
analysis. It would be impossible for one person to verify the findings of thc research.
A survey of every tenth volume since 1930 of the periodical .tiiU1lli; shows lhat lhe
average number of authors per article has increased dramatically, and has incrcaSL'I1
faster in recent decades. In 1930, the average number of authors per articles was 1.2;
by 1990 it had more than tripled to 4.1. The survey also shows that the average numhcr
of countries represented per article increased by 5% from 193010 1980; in the next len
years it increased by 14% (Norris & Griffiths, 1992, May). Increasingly, rescarch is
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being done using teams of scientists instead of individuals, and the time and the
expertise necessary 10 complete such projects prohibits theiT being done by individuals.
Thus, such research is nol only not being reproduced, the total evidence, rationale,
analysis, and interpretation is not known (or knowable) by one individual. Scientists
must trust their colleagues working on the same project, since their science
backgrounds, technical expertise, and duration of their lives do not permit them to verify
all the findings for themselves. If a scientist betrays that trust, horror sweeps through
the scientific community: ~cach researcher is forced to acknowledge the extenllO which
his own work rests on the work of olhers -- work which he has nOI and could not (if
only for reasons of time and eltpcnse) verify for himself' (Hardwig, 1985, p. 348).
Origjnality jn Science
Another factor that inhibits scientific knowledge from being replicated or verified
by an individual is the value placed on originality in science. Hardwig (1991) asserts
that Mthe structure of modem science acts to prevent replication, not to ensure it. It is
virtually impossible to obtain funding for attempts to replicate the work of others, and
academic credit normally is given only for new findings" (p. 703). Thus, scientists are
not encouraged, financially or academically, to replicate the works of other scientists,
and many cltperiments are never verified or replicated because of this. Scientists accept
these scientific knowledge claims by relying on the testimony of other scientists, not
because they have actually verified the results for themselves. They must trust that the
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scientists have published the resulls honestly and without distorting or inventing d;lln.
This is not to say that scientirlC experiments are never replicated. Some arc. II is
also not to say thaI replication is the only means of discovering errors. SOIlk."\illlL'S.
errors are discovered indirectly when the consequences of experimental results leau III
CDnuadictions.
The Self-Policing of Science
The three mechanisms that make up the sclf·policing system of science, m:clITding
to Broad and Wade (1982), are peer review, the referee system, and replication. 1'l.'CC
review refers to the process of evaluation by commillccs of scientists. who arc
responsible for deciding which researeh grant applications should be awardl.'tl funding.
-The committee members are meant to read each application with great care, rating each
according 10 its scientific merits. This process is the first Slagc a\ which any fraudulent
research proposal might be caught" (Broad & Wade, 1982, p. 62).
The second mechanism, the referee system, comes into effcct when a (lil()Cr has
been submitted for publication in a scientific joumal. I\t this stage, the editor uf ,he
journal will send the paper to other scientists working within the same field so that they
will referee the paper, and
advise the editor as to whether the work is new, whether it properly
acknowledges the ·other researchers on whose results it depends, and mo~t
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importantly, whether the right methods have been used in conducting the
experiment and the right arguments in discussing the results. (Broad and Wade,
1982, p. 17)
These referees do not replicate the experiment; they judge its merit according to Ihe
above criteria. Thus, the results aTC not verified or confirmed in Ihe refereeing process;
the referees trust that those submitting papers for publication have not tried to distort
the resurts or 10 invent data 10 support their hypotheses.
The third mechanism, replication, deals with the way that other scientists. upon
reading a paper published in a journal, can try to replicate the results by performing
similar experiments. Experiments must be described in such a manner so as to make
replication possible so that, as Broad and Wade (1982) assert, ~any fraudulent
experiment, so established wisdom goes, is liable to be shown up when others try to
replicate it" (p. 62). For reasons described earlier, experiments are not replicated as
a rule. Broad and Wade (1982) describe numerous scientists who have becn caught
trying to publish fraudulent or plagiarized results. In most of the cases, neither of the
three policing mechanisms were SUCCf'.5sful in detecting the fraud. Instead, in most
cases. the fraud was detected by a person working closely with the scientist who had
access to information or data that the reviewers or other scientists did not. Even in
cases where replication was attempted and failed, the fraud was still not identified as
such. since those attempting replication felt that they were not performing a technique
properly or that the scientist who had published the paper had more skill.
Thus, the so called "self-policing" of science seems to be based more on trust than
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on replication: editors, reviewers, and fellow scientists must trust lhal those making the
scientific knowledge claims performed their experiments as they have rccordceJ them,
got the results that lhey claim. and analyzed all the data, oot just the data thai supporh."lI
their hypotheses. They must trust tht$C; scientists because they usually do nOI. fur
reasons of expertise, time, and money. verify Ihe results for themselvC5.
Epis1cmjc I)cpendcntt
It appears thai scientists. in almost every phase of thcir education anti pmrCS.~iur1011
careers, must lrust their teachers and fellow scientists since Ihey have neither lhe
expertise. time, nor money to verify all the scientific knowledge claims thaI lhey claim
to know and depend on to do their research. While there is much in science fur which
they do know the evidence and reasons, there is a lot that Ihey have nol verified
personally, and much knowledge for which they do nOl know the cvidcm:c ur R:<lSloK1S.
Hardwig (1985) claims that laypeople and scicntislS alike arc epislcmically
dependent on the scientific community. Submilling to this dependence, he aSo'iCrts, i.~
often more rational than trying to determine the evidence for oncsclr. He arguCli th."
people may claim to know propositions without being able to u,lderslant! the rca.'ions or
evidence thai support them, if they believe that c.(pcrts have good reasons for helieving
the propositions. Increasingly, experimcnts are being performed wilh large IC01ms uf
scientists from different fields ofexpertise, so that no one scientist knows all thc reasons
or evidence for the result. Each scientist in that team is epistcmically dependent on the
27
others working on the same projocl.
Epistemic individualists, if there ever were such people, are being replaced by
epislcmic communities, where everyone in that community relies on others for their
knowledge. Code (1987) argues that epistemie individualism is a fallacy:
Early childhood knowledge acquisition gives some indication of the scope of
cognitive interdependence, and it would be a mistake to think that
interdependence ends with childhood, that malure cognitive agents arc
recognizable by achieved autonomy. Childhood leaches us how to be
interdependent. To entertain the illusion that, in adulthood, one leaves this
interdependence entirely behind is to discount much ofone's everyday cognitive
experience. (p. 169)
Rom Harre (1986) writes specifically about the shared knowledge in a scientific
community. In fact, the title of the first chapter in varietjes of Rea!ism (1986) is
"Science as a Communal Practice", In recognizing the dependence of laypeople and
scientists on the work of other scientists, Harre (1986) refers several times to the need
for a moral order or a code of ethics that must be followed by scientists practising in
the scientific community, Since "scientific knowledge, is itself defined in moral terms..
It is that knowledge upon which one can rely" (Harre, p. 13), the scientific community
must adhere to a strict moral code, Failing to adhere to this moral order will result in
the trUSlworthiness of the scientific community being called into question. "The practical
reliability of scientific knowledge is required to sustain its moral quality" (Harre, p.13).
Thus, perceiving science as a communal practice, with scientists being dependent upon
:,
other scientists for their knowledge, imparts a totally difrc~nl pcrsp..'C1ivc on scientific
knowledge. with the emphasis being on how trustwonhy or reliable the scientific
knowledge claim is. However. if science is perceived as an individual endeavour. with
all Jcnowledge claims being verified before being accepted. science is perceived as being
much more rational and objective. with no need for the terms -moralityM atlll
-reliability·,
Polanyi, in his description orlhe apprenticeship of young scientists and of the tither
ways in which the scientific community exhibits mutual reliance among il.~ lIlcrnhcrs,
depicts the scientific conscience that must pervade all the members of the scientific
community. Scientists must subscribe to the premises of science Khy an actllr t1cYI)\iun"
(1946, p. 54) so that the tradition of science will be upheld. Mit is a spiritual reality
which stands over them and compels their allegiancc· ( 1946, p. 54), so thai ·1!lc
scientist nonnally performs his emotional and moral surrender to science· (1946. p. 551.
Thus scientists, when exercising their authority over their fellow sciCl1tists and
laypeople. must act in a moral and responsible way so thallkey, and their pruduc1~. the
scientific knowledge claims, can be trusted.
In this chapter I have attempted to portray the many areas of .science in which trust
and a reliance on testimony arc an integral part. Expensive instruments, highly
specialized experts, teams of scientists working on international science projects, human
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mortality and the sheer magnitude of the scientific knowledge being generated are all
{actors that decrC3se the likelihood of replication of scientific experiments. The ability
to understand or assess the reasons and evidence for scientific knowledge claims today
appears to be beyond the reach of all but the most specialized of scientists in a particular
field. Scientists and laypeople alike are often epistcmically dependent on other
scientists.
Scientists, then, often acquire scientific knowledge without understanding the
reasons or evidence thai support it, and without confirming such knowledge for
themselves. Science students, however, arc to be encouraged to attain intellectual
independence by being able to assess the soundness of scientific knowledge claims when
they arc often incapable of understanding the evidence and reasons for them. Educators
that advocate intellectual independence as a goal of science education arc not only giving
students an unrealistic view of their abilities, and perhaps discouraging them from a
career in science by pUlling undue pressure on them, they are also portraying a picture
of scientists as excessively rational, analytical, and omnipotent.
The next chapter looks at approaches to teaching the nature of science to see the
means by Wllich various degrees of intellectual independence arc espoused as being
attainable. Subsequently, these expectations of the degrees of intellectual independence
attainable are juxtaposed with the reality of epistemic dependence to determine if some
level of intellectual independence is possible.
Chapter Four
Approaches for Teaching the Nature of Science
and the Attainment of Intellectual Independence
I have demonstrated that increasing students' uooerstanding of the nature of science
is a long standing goal of science education, and that it is often justilicd as a means of
increasing students' intellectual independence and critical thinking abilities. However,
I have also shown that trust plays a major role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge
for both scientists and laypeople, and that scientislS and laypcople alike arc inescilp:\uly
epistemically dependent on other scientists. Examination of the approaches 10 IC:lching
the nature of science is warranted, it seems, for two reasons. First, the eXOlmin.1tinn
should inquire into how scientists are portrayed as acquiring SCK:nlirlC knowlcllgc.
Portraying scientisl5 as guided only by reasons, evidence, and experimental fC:!illll~
would gi\'e an inaccurate view of how much of their scientific knowledge is acquiJl'(].
Second, the examination should inquire into how increasing stoocnl5' knowledge of lhe
nature of science is to lead to lheir intellectual independence. Three approachc.~ arc
used to teach the nature of science. namely, that of using the history of science,
labwark, and the phila.sophy of science. All will be examined to ~"C if they offer any
panicular advantage far achieving this educational goal.
There is some averlap between these three approaches. Far example, there is Hn
inherent philosophy of science that is conveyed in using p3rticular laboratory approachcs
such as discovery learning. As well, separate analysis is not meant to imply that
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teachers orcurricuJa use only one approach exclusively; many teachers and curricula use
more than one when leaching about the nature of science. These three approaches do,
however, offer different perspectives on the nature of science and strategies for
increasing intellectual independence.
The History of Science
The means and justifications for teaching the history of science are varied. Because
of this. general statements about the consequences of leaching the history of science are
nOl possible without subdividing this section further. A review of articles and curricula
thaI emphasize this goal reveals three ways that the history of science is conveyed to
students. The first method involves simply listing names of inventors or scientists with
their corresponding discoveries or contributions to science. The second method includes
the inrormation givcn using the first method, but also includes details of the
experimental work done, observations made, and interpretations made that resulted in
the scientific contributions. The third method subsumes the second, but also includes
personal, economic, and sociological information that is pertinent to the discovery.
Namcs Dales and Discoveries
This method of teaching the history of science is the least inclusive of all the
methods; it involves providing only the barest of details about scientific discoveries.
l'
Typically, only the scientists' names, the discoveries Ihal were made, and perhaps the
dates of the discoveries are provided. No details about how the discoveries were made
or confirmed are provided, much less any panicular sociological or personal details.
Many science textbooks use this approach, as well as more inclusive approaches,
for leaching some conc,"pts. BSeS Biology (1968) lists the history of biologic.lI
concepts as its second theme in the forward of the second edition. However, the text's
use of the history of science is not as prevalent as the forward suggests. Lt)okin~
through the text for historical material to see what aspects of the nalure of $Cicnce arc
portrayed leaves the impression that the history of science is not a major theme, hut a
minor inclusion. The first four chapters inelude only one historical account. and it is
typical of the approach being discussed. The results of Thomas Mallhu.'>' studies Oil
population are given, without descriptions of experimental work or methods. Other
excerpts from the history of science arc given in subsequent chapters. I;or the must
part, these are brief, chronologically ordered descriptions of when certain organisrn.~
where first observed or principles developed. Many of the experimental details arc
omitted, as well as other related details that would give a fuller picture of whal .o;cicl1cc
is really like. This is not to say that BSCS Biology uscs exclusively thj.~ approach III
the history of science; a more comprehensive historical account of experimental work
is in the chapter on heredity, where the experimental works of Mendel, Sutton, and
Morgan arc described. However, for the most part, the evidence and reasons thai
scientists had for their scientific knowledge claims arc not given; students arc nlll given
any information that would help them evaluate the claims.
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This approach 10 teaching the history of science is quite common in science
textbooks. Other, more inclusive, approaches may degenerate into this approach if
teachers fccls they don't have enough time to cover what may be considered extra
material or frills. If this is the only method used to teach the nature of science, then
students will not be taught how science progresses, how scientists make decisions or
interpretations, or how trust plays a role in science. Students may perceive scientific
knowledge as growing and changing without understanding how or why. and thus may
be sceptical of scientific knowledge claims, hold them tentatively, but be unable 10
assess by themselves the soundness of the knowledge claims. This approach to tcaching
the history of science pUiS students in the greatest position of epistemic dependence on
their teachers and textbooks.
Names Dates and Experimental pelajls
Using this approach to teaching the history of science, the experimental det.ails that
support the scientific knowledge claims arc given. This approach currently is gaining
prominence as a means of promoting conceptual change in students. Students oflen hold
misconceptions about science that are very similar to earlier scientific beliefs. By
describing to the students experiments that show how newer conceptions are more
accurate and acceptable, students are more likely to adopt the currently accepted
scientific theory than hold to the older outdated version.
An early champion of this approach was Emst Mach. His approach to science
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teaching is described by Matthews (1990):
Aim for understanding and comprehension of the subject matter; teach a lillie,
bUI teach it well; follow the historical order of development of a subject .. oy
teaching science, teach about science; show that just as individual ideas can be
improved, so also scientific ideas have constantly been, and will continue to be,
overhauled and improved ... " (1990, p. 320)
Matthews goes on to describe three reasons for Mach's usc of the historical
approach to teaching science. First, the historical approach encourages undcrslml<!ing
of scientific concepts: "He believed in a vague form of the recapitulation Ihc.~is later
popularized by Piaget: thaI children's intellectual growth closely follows thai of the
development of science" (1990. p. 321). Second, Mach felt that the historical apflroach
emphasizes the fallibility of science, and as such should prevent scicntisillo Mauhews
quotes Mach: "Whoever knows only one view or one form of a view docs not hclicve
that another has ever stood in its place, or that another will ever succeed it; he neither
doubts nor tests" (Mach, 1911, p. (7). Thus students were meant to bc sceptical of all
scientific knowledge claims, and intellectual independence was encouraged;
"Recognizing the historicity of all cognition promoted independence of mind. a cardinitl
virtue for Mach" (Matthews, 1990, p.321). Third, Mach thought that the histurical
method of teaching science would show students how science is to be conducted. anti
provide a model for them \0 follow in their own inquiries.
Although Mach's ideas are more than one hundred years old, many cducalors still
find them relevant today. Duschl, for one, seems 10 advocate this method of science
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teaching for very similar reasons. Without clarification or explicit instruction,
howcVCl", an incomplete picture of science and epistemology of science is portrayed.
By teaching a few conccplS in great detail, showing how (hey were developed, expanded
and refined by lhe various contributing scientists, students may perceive wat scientists
replicate or analyze the evidence and reasons for all scientific knowledge claims
throughout history. This method, with its focus on undentanding the reasons and
evidence for scientific knowledge claims Ihroughoot history, suggests that nol only must
students be able to understand current knowledge claims, they must also be able to
understand all the evidence and reasons for past knowledge claims, and why they were
inadequate compared 10 the current theories. The burden placed on the student (and
the leacher) is tremendous.
This method, by focusing only on the experimental details and omitting personal and
sociological factors, portrays science as an extremely rational enterprise. By showing
the inadequacies of past theories and the supporting evidence for current theories (the
method of promoting conceptual change), this approach may not promote a tentative
view towards current scientific knowledge claims. That is, students may come to
understand that past theories were tentative, but, by spending so much time and effort
convincing them of the validity of current theories, may be much more likely to believe
them as being true for all time. More to the point of this thesis, this method promotes
the view that scientists, and students if they are to understand science, must understand
the reasons and evidence for past and current scientific theories. It does not address
their epislemic dependence on scientists with respect to the vast amount of scientific
.I~
knowledge being generated, for which they will have neither the time nor lbe c"pcrI;sc
to learn and undeDtand all the supporting evidence and reasons.
Names [)ates Discoveries' ilnd Experimeolal pcrsol\jl! and SociQlogical petaUs
Teaching a history of science thaI includes names, dales, discoveries. as well a.~
experimental, personal, and sociological details is becoming increasingly popu!;u.
However, the method is nol new. Teaching the more inclusive perspective on the
history of science was the goal of James Conant. His book On understandinG scicnce
(1947) reiterated many of the ideas of Mach concerning leaching the history of SciCIlCC.
Conant wrote that laypersons should be made aware of the -tactics and slrntcgiC,'l of
science" (Conant, 1947, p. 16). Conant opposed what he took to be Iypkal of
philosophies of the time. which espoused a view that "the scientific method is markctl
by the following features; (a) careful and accurate c1assirlcation of facts and obscrvalion
of their correlation and sequence..... (Pearson, 191 I, p. 37). Cooant instead propo9..'d
that "the stumbling way in which even the ablest of the early scientists had to lighl
through thickets of erroneous observation, misleading generalizations, inadL'qUlllc
formulations, and unconscious prejudice is the story which seems to me needs tclling"
(Conant, 1947, p. IS). In Conant's view, science philosophies current in his day did
not portray an accurate picture of the scientific enterprisc; a more accurate picture could
be seen by studying the history of science, including as much as possible the social
climate, personal conflicts and competition, and difficulties involved in theory lran.~ition.
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A central theme in his teaching was the evolution of new conceptual schemes.
Conant constantly reminds the reader that what seems so obvious now was not always
so obvious. This is an important element in students' understanding the rationality of
past scientists:
What most of us today regard as a facl, namely, that the earth is surrounded
by a sea ofair that exerts pressure, was in the 1640's a new conceptual scheme
that had still to weather a series of experimental tests before it would be
generally adopted, (Conant & Nash, 1964, p. 6)
Conant helps students see how scientists could hold the beliefs they did so strongly,
even in the face of evidence to the contrary. He starts the story of Torricelli's
experimental work with some philosophical advice:
Lei us remember that the conceptual scheme implied by the phrase 'nature
abhors a vacuum' was by no means the nonsense we sometimes imply today.
In a limited way this idea explained adequately a number of apparently
unrelated phenomena and that is one of the tests of any conceptual scheme.
(Conant, 1947, 36)
Statements like these are abundant throughout his text. Also prevalent in his case
studies is a great deal of original material by scientists. These illustrate working
hypotheses, details on laboratory setups, observations obtained, and inferences made.
They also include the slOps and starts, the changing of equipment when results were not
rorthcoming, and the speculations and expectations that preceded the observations.
.\8
AnoUler inclusion in his case studies is a Science and Society section, in which
relevant historical material is related to the scientist's work.
Conant's ca.<;e studies appear to convey \0 students several aspects of the scientific
enterprise. Analyses that involve philosophical, as wen as sociological, economic. anti
personal factors are included, as well as descriptions both of theory development and
justification. Throughout the text runs a strong central theme of tentativeness in science.
Another well-known advocate of leaching a comprehensive history of science is
Gerald Holton, onc of the directors of the high school physics curriculum HarvOlrtl
Project Pllysics (Hollon, Rutherford & Watson, 1968). Hollon though! 'hal in historicOlI
accounts of science nine dimensions should be addressed for a complete understanding
of a scientific event. Acknowledging some overlap between dimensions, he describes
them as such:
I. The awareness of public scientific knowledge at the time of a scientific event.
2. A time trajectory of the state of public scientific knowledge that leads up to and
goes beyond the scientific event. Included would be parallel developments,
continuities and discontinuities, and the tracing of public opinion.
3. The reconstruction of the personal aspect of the scientific event. Letters, drafts,
laboratory notebooks, interviews and the like would be studied.
4. A time trajectory of the private scientific activity under study.
5. The psyehobiographical development of the scientist.
6. A line that traces thc ideological or political as well as litcrary events and relates
them to the other trajcctories.
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7. The sociological seUing, conditions, influences that arise from, for example, the
dynamics ofleam work, the link between science and public policy, or institutional
channels for the funding, evaluation, and acceptance of scientific work.
8. The analysis of the epistemological and logical structure of the work under study.
9. The individual scientist's thematic presuppositions that motivate his research.
(Holton, 1988)
Holton intended to incorporate these dimensions in Harvard Project Physics.
Instead of teaching unconnected scientific concepts, Holton wanted to show the links that
could be made between science and olher areas like philosophy, political science,
literature and arts:
One can thereby hope 10 develop a sequence of organically related ideas whose
pursuit lakes on an ever higher vantage point, a more encompassing view of the
working nature, of the style of life of the scientist, and of the power of the
human mind. (Hollon, 1976, p. 334)
Many excerpts from Harvard Project Physics tell a detailed story of scientific
developments, However, like BSCS Biology (Green Version, 1968), thedetail is 110t
mainlaincd uniformly throughout. At times, only the names, dales and discoveries are
given, and students must accept the results without questioning, sinee without the
evidence or details of the experiment they have no grounds for judging the results. In
other cases, the experimental evidence is described, and shown to falsify a theory, yet
due to external Factors (loyalty to another scientist, disbelief of evidence, questioning
the credibility of a scientist) the evidence is not accepted as falsifying the theory.
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Two examples illustrate Ihese two ex.tremes. In discussing the falsification of
Newlon's corpuscular theory of light, Ihe text shows how the two theories of lighl. the
wave theory and the corpuscular theory, offer contradictory predictions about the
relative speed of light through water and air.
You might think that it would be fairly easy 10 devise an experiment 10
determine which prediction is corrcet. All onc has to do is measure lhe SPCl'(!
of tight in water... Not until the middle of tile nineteenth century did Fizeau
and Foucault measure lhe speed of light in water. The results agreed with the
predictions of lhe wave model: the speed of light is [ower in water than in
air... The Foucault-Fizeau experiments of 1850 were generally rcgar<lcd as
driving the last nail in Ihe coffin of the particle theory. (Hollon, Rutherford,
& Watson, 1968, p.l2-13)
This illustrates a situation where content is taught by providing only the
experimental result without any description of the experimental setup or the data IIml
support the result. Only one of Holton's nine dimensions is visible: a time trajectory
of publie scientific actiYIty is sketched throughout the section.
The section that follows lhe statement of Foucauh-Fizeau's results provides a sharp
contrastlo the authoriti'.tive prose. In a description of the work of Thomas Young, an
excellent job is done to include as many of Holton's nine dimensions, and to show a
segment of science's history in an interesting and accuralC way. Young'!; douhle-slit
experiment is described in suitable detail for the students to understand. In the margin
there is a picture of Young, along with a brief synopsis of his interest!; and occupations.
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Pictures of his original drawings are given, along with direct quotes from an original
paper. What follows conveys without doubt how experimental evidence is sometimes
received by the scientific community and society:
Young was received with ridicule and even hostility by those British scientists
to whom Newton's name was sacred. It was flO! until 1818, when the French
physicist Augustin Fresnel proposed a mathematical wave theory of his own.
that Young's research gOllhe credit it deserved. (Holton, et aJ., 1968, p. 14)
To further illustrate the rejection of Young's work, a negative review from the
EdjnbllrRh Review is included, which slates "this paper. .. is in fact destitute of every
species of merit" (Holton, et aI" 1968, p. 14). In Ihis excerpt a detailed picture of how
scientific evidence may be rejecled or ignored is imparted, and scientists are seen as not
being the objective, prejudice· free people they are orten purported to be.
Conant's and Holton's works illustrate this third approach to teaching the history
of science. Scientific discoveries seem to be analyzed on every dimension, with the
implication that to understand scientific discoveries and scientific theory change, a full
picture that includes not only thc experimental details but also personal, economic, and
social details, is necessary. Using this approach, the students must replicate some past
cl(periments to confirm them first hand. For many of the experiments tl1at are not
replicated, the experimental evidence and reasons for scientific knowledge claims are
given for the students to assess. As well, students must judge the source of the
scientific knowledge claim by analyzing personal, social and economic conditions. The
burden of analysis becomes heavier for the student (and, again. the teacher).
'2
While this type of exposition is very interesting and entertaining to read, using this
method to analyze CUTTent or future scientific discoveries often will prove fruit1cs~ for
students. The level of expertise required for critically analyzing loday's scientific
discoveries, as well as the insight necessary to evaluate social and economic conditiuns,
is much too high for students, and many scientists as well, \0 be able 10 assess pro(lllriy.
Thus, while students may have a detailed account of past, basic discoveries. they likdy
do not have the means to judge current or future discoveries in the same way.
The use of a more complete history of science, one that includes IlCTStlll,L1,
sociological and economic details, does seem to be the best method to show the rule uf
trust in science. In Conant and Nash's (1964) and Holton's (1978) case studies lhis
message was, to a large extent, implicit. Historical descriptions of past scicntilic
discoveries that deal explicitly with the role of trust in the acceptance of scicntific ideas
would serve 10 illustrate the point even more; perhaps even descriptions of the way lhal
scientists who betrayed that trust to further their scientific careers would illustrate the
prevalence and necessity of trust in the scientific community, and the need for stricl
ethics in science.
Of the three methods of teaching the history or science outlined, the lhird methud
seems to portray the most complete picture of the scientific enterprise and l>CCms to hold
the most promise for portraying the role or trust in science. It also may be the methud
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most effective in promoting a good underslanding of scientific knowledge claims and
reasons for past theory change. It aims for a complete analysis of past scientific
knowledge claims, as well as a basis for holding tenla-lively future knowledge claims by
portraying the humanistic side of science. However, as a general method of analyzing
and assessing the soundness of knowledge claims. which is necessary in promoting
intellectual independence and critical thinking, the third methoo is doomed to fail. The
lime, equipment, expertise, as well as the personal, economic and social details, that
would be nceded to analyze most current and future scientific knowledge claims in the
same manner arc beyond lIle reach of students, and for that matter, most scientists as
well. In this respect, the students arc in the position to know only the discovery and
date of any future knowledge claim, and perhaps the name of the chief or main scientist
working on the team that made the discovery. They are in a position of epistemic
dependence. Without the means to judge the scientific knowledge claim or the scientists
that made it, they will be able only 10 be sceptical of a scientific process that they have
been (old is open to human error and interpretation. and helieve the prooucls of science
\0 be tentative. However, they will have no means \0 question the actual knowledge
claim on a rational basis.
Laboratory Appmachs!.
A second method that is often employed in science education to convey an
understanding of the nature of science is the usc of laboratory activities. experiments.
or demonslr.l.tions in which students ·behave like scientists·. The.sc are used to impart
a wide range of perspectives about the nature of science: learning a scientific ll1ethod.
learning how scientists make discoveries or reach conclusions, and learning lhe
epistemological status of scientific knowledgec1aims. The underlying assumption is thaI
the best way to show what science is like is to do it. Sometimes the lab activities :lrc
designed specifically to convey an aspect of the nature of science; other times different
objectives, like skill or conlent acquisition, arc emphasized. Nevertheless, many
students may feel that the activities that they do in the labor.alory aceur.atcly rcprc.scnl
the way science is done, whether that is the intention or not
In this section, gener.al approaches to labor.atory work lhat arc used to convey an
aspect of the nature of science will be analyzed 10 sec whether they impart a panicular
epistemology of science, and whether that epistemology aeknowlalges the role IIf tnlst
in science. As well, the labor.atory approaches will be examined to sec whether a IlICOins
for achieving intellectual independence is available. Common approachc.~ to laboratory
work in school include inquiry, discovery learning, science fairs or projects, a pmt:c.~.~
approach, and constructivist-motivated laboratories. These will be described and
examined in this section. Laboratory approaches that will not be discussed in this
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section arc experiments that demonstrate, confirm, or tcst theories.
Joseph Schwab is largely responsible for coining the phrase ·science as inquiry",
or, as he prefers, "enquiry". He criticizes science teKtbooks that portray science as a
set of collected facts, or, in his terms, as a "rhetoric of conciusionsM (Schwab. 1964,
p. 24). Instead, Schwab asserts that science should be taught
as a product of nuid enquiry; [the public should] understand that it is a mode
of invcstigation which rests on conceptual innovation, proceeds through
uncertainty an,j failure, and eventuates in knowledge whch~ is contingent.
dubitable, and hard to come by. (p. 5)
Schwab postulates a distinction between stable and fluid enquiry in a manner
roughly equivalent to Kuhn's (1962) distinction between normal and revolutionary
science. He argues that science has alwa}'s been taught as a stable inquiry, where
current theories and principles are taught, and research is seen to involve using these
theories and principles "to fill a particular blank space in the growing body of
knowledge" (1964, p. 16). Thi!: type of education does not answer the current needs
of society. he argues, since scientific growth involves questioning tht'.se basic theories
and principles, and the invention of new conceptions. This type of activity is fluid
inquiry; it is typified by subjcct mailer being redefined by new principles that guide the
next phase of stable inquiry. Schwab calls this the revisionary character of scientific
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knowledge, and maintains that science should be laught as involving refinements ur
current principles or theories (stable inquiry) as well as the complete revisioll liT
replacement of them (fluid inquiry).
Schwab's goal in teaching science as an inquiry is to convey 10 students the
appropriate manner in which to hold the massive amount of knowledge being generated.
He asserts that the rate of revision in science has accelerated in recenl years In the
extent that scientific knowledge is quickly becoming outdated. If students do nol
understand the methods of stable and fluid inquiry, <llld their resulting products and
revisions of knowledge, confidence in science will diminish:
Unprepared for such a change [in scientific knowledge) and unaware of whOlI
produced it, the former student can do no better than to doubt the SOUlu.lness
of his textbooks and his teachers. In a great many cases, this doubt of lC<lcher
and textbook becomes a doubt ofseience itself, and of professional competence
in general. The former student has no recourse but to fall into a dangerolls
relativism or cynicism. (Schwab, 1963, p.45.)
Connelly, Finegold, Clipsham and Wahlstrom (1977) reiterate this vicw in their
book SdcotjOc Enouir:v and the Teaching of Science;
The ultimate goal is to develop the student's power and freedom with ~~sJlCcl
to scientiOc knowledge - that is, to develop in him the intellcclUal capacity In
inform himself about a field of enquiry such as chemistry or physics. In Ihis
way he becomes independent of the teacher and of the curriculum, ultimately
free of these two constraints in his education ... The basic concern is to
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encourage the intelleclual independence of students with respect to scientific
knowledge claims. (p. 7)
Thus by teaching science as an inquiry, (hat is, emphasizing the human creativity
and interpretation that is used to generate scientific knowledge claims and thus the
tentative nature of the products of science, intellectual independence will be encouraged.
Studcnls, by judging appropriately scientific knowledge claims as tentative, will nOl
question the rationality of scientists and the scientific process when changes occur,
because they will understand how scientific knowledge is generated and will expect
revisions or changes.
Schwab's inquiry approach to laboratory work is illustrated to a small degree in
BSeS (green version) High Schoo! Biology (1963), of which Schwab was theedilor, and
to a much larger extent in his "Invitations to Enquiry" (Schwab, 1963) (supplementary
activities thaI were designed by Schwab for the BSCS texts). The laboratory activities
in BSCS green version (1963) are intended to show models of inquiry by showing how
the lahoratory can be used to generate scientific knowledge claims. The main focus
seems to be on content acquisition with inquiry as a minor focus:
Many of the exercises are of the traditional kind, serving the necessary
traditional purpose of making clear and vivid materials expounded by the text.
But many are of another kind. They are not illustrative but investigatory.
They treat problems for which the text does not provide answers. They create
situations in which the student may participate in the enquiry. (Schwab, 1963,
p.40)
It seems clear from this sUltement that Schwab intends these investigatory activities
to mirror the work of scientists. As such, laboratory work was to precede classroolll
instruction, or ooilcem itself with subject areas not covered in the classroom, so IIml
students would be able to conduct their own program of inquiry with varying dcgn..-cs
of openness and permissiveness. Three levels of openness are described, with lIctivitics
in which the given information ranges from problems and proposed means to solve thcm
but no answers; to problems with neither means nor answers; to situations where
students must find their own problems. means and answers.
Hjgh Schoo! Biology (BSCS green version, 1968), for the lIlost part. gave the
background information. purpose. and procedure of the investigations, leaving llle
student to perform the lab and interpret the data by answering leading questions. This
approach to teaching science as an inquiry amounts to displaying only the variety Ill'
ways that the data is obtained and interpreted in a laboratory, and places less eillphasis
on the students' ability to formulate their own problems and procedures. The answers
to some of the problems being investigated are given to the students, not in the l:lh
manual, but in the textbook, so that "the appearancc, but nol lhc reality, of enquiry is
provided" (Schwab, 1964, p.55).
In Schwab's (1963) "Invilations to Enquiry" students get a more in-depth look <It
the process of inquiry itself. Instead of inquiring to gain scicntilic knowledge through
the use of the lab, students are given information about scientist's attempts at inquiry,
and are asked to analyze, in depth, various aspects of Ihe process to sec the logical
foundations of the hypotheses, the way they are tested, the way that the conceptions of
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the scientists affect the interpretations, and the different types of cltperimental error.
Thus, while the actual investigatory laboratory work is meant to imitate scientific
inquiry, the Invitations to Enquiry are inquiries into inquiry. These invitations
emphasize the reasons why scientific knowledge is tentative by showing the assumptions.
inferences, and errors that are made in the inquiry process.
If these invitations were discussed and debated in class, (as supplementary material,
it may be overlooked) sluden!!\ would get a very good view of the interpretive nalure of
scientific knowledge claims. and would no doubt hold scientific knowledge claims with
a high degree of tentativeness. Students would also practice analyzing reasons for
making decisions, since the invitations provide a very structured, critical, analytical look
at scientific investigations, al),j, ~s such, illustrate a model of rationality that the students
can usc. Starr (1972) has provided evidence that students who used these invitations did
improve their critical thinking skills more than students who followed the regular BSCS
High School Biology textbook.
Inquiry, then, with its heavy emphasis on the analysis of the scientific process of
generating and justifying knowledge claims, attempts to encourage intellectual
independence and critical thinking in two ways. First, it deals extensively with the
process of generating scientific knowledge claims, and provides models of scientific
work so that students will be able to inquire into problems of their own. Second, by
focusing on the process of how scientific knowledge is created, it attempts to make
students hold scientific knowledge as tentative so tbat they will be open to new ideas,
and less likely to hold current scientific knowledge claims as absolute.
.'i0
Discoyery and Inquiry
What differentiates "inquiry\ as discussed in the previous section. from
"discovery"? Inquiry is meant to focus on the critical analysis of the processes illvulved
in interpreting data, and on the process of justifying scientific knowledge claims. so that
students can see how the knowledge gained is constructed and therefore tentiltive.
Discovery methods tend to focus on the students' personal acquisition of the products
of scientific activity, the scientific knowledge claim itself.
The discovery approach to laboratory work, which is largcly cn.'1Iitcd In H. E.
Armstrong (Brock, 1973) in the late 18oo's, is seen in many forms in science curricula,
bUt in general refers to any laboratory experiment or activity, whether structun.:d or not,
in which the results to be gained are unknown to thc student at the onset of the work,
as opposed to a laboratory activity that illustrates a principle Ihat already has heen
learned. The goal of Ihis approach is for students to "(]iscover" the scientific knowledge
for themselves, instead of having it told 10 them. More recently, Jerome Bruner
advocated this method of learning, not only for science, bUI for many subjl..'Ct arca.~.
Discovery, he asserts,
whether by a schoolboy going it on his own or by a scicntist cultivating the
growing edge of his field, is in its essence a matter of rcarrnnging or
transforming evidence in such a way thai one is enabled to go beyond the
evidence so reassembled to new insights. (Bruner, 1962, p. 82)
The relationship between discovery and inquiry is delineated by Suchman (1962),
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as he describes the compon{;;.lts of inquiry:
(Inquiry) can be divided into four main types of actions: searching, data
processing, discovery and verification. While none of these actions is unique
to inquiry, they are all essential to it, and in combination, form a cycle of
o~ralions that characterize the inquiry process. (p. 5)
Thus discovery is a part of the inquiry process, and, as such it is very difficult to
talk about one without the other, which may be one of the reasons why the terms gel
confused so often. An approach that focuses on teaching students how to proceed in
finding out the answers to questions they might have, or on the processes involved in
investigating, would be emphasizing inquiry; whereas an approach that stressed students
acquiring scientific knowledge by themselves, whether the procedure for determining
this knowledge is given to them or not, would be emphasizing discovery, To further
confuse this issue is an approach that emphasizes students' discovery of the means of
inquiry: students arc taught how to inquire, nol by specific inSlruction about various
strategies or procedures, but by being presenled with a problem or discrepant event and
having to discover, or figure out for themselves, effective strategies for investigating it.
This approach, which involves students behaving in an autonomous, self-directed
fashion, rather Ihan following a set of instructions, is what many writers (Bruner, 1962;
Ivany, 1975; Suchman, 1962) mean when they use the word "inquiry·,
Whether learning by discovery and inquiry laboratory approaches is autonomous or
not depends. 10 a large extent, on the age of the student. In elementary grades a
completely autonomous learning approach is more likely 10 be used. whereas as the
students progress into junior and high school, the k.arning is much more likely t(1 he
guided. For example, a science curriculum that has used autonomous inquiry and
discovery learning as one of the main themes is Nuffield Foundation's~
(1972). The curriculum materials consist of a scries of books for the tC4\Chl:f tlml
provide suggested topics and questions Ihat the studcnt may wan! to invcstigmc.
Students, between the ages of 5 and 13, that afC taking this course arc free tn inquirl:
into any subject they wish, and to develop questions that they wan! 10 answer. Thl:Y;lrl:
also responsible for deciding how they arc going to find answers, and for dell:rmining
the limitations on the answers that they derive. In a class, several groups may he
working on different problems, with thc teacher acting as a guidc. If the methods llwl
the students usc arc not efficient or effective, or if thc answers dctermincd do nllt .'>CClll
to make sense, or do not have enough accuracy, students arc encouragcd to develop
othcr methods or to try to repeat their experiments for greater accuracy.
Communication between groups is encouraged, and students periodically report their
findings and methods to the rest of the class.
As students go from elemcntary to junior high and beyond, thc importancc or
scientific knowledge acquisition leads to a discovcry approach thai is much lllorC
teacher-directed. Ivany (1975) describes this guided-discovery model of teaching as ".1
deliberate attempt to structure experiences for children so that through clI.plordlions Ihey
will be led to find out for themselves some of the basic ideas of science" (p. 1)6). The
Nuffield Foundation~ (1967) curriculum that follows~usc.~ thi.~
approach. Students are encouraged to become actively involved in the invc.~tigation
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process so thai "a picture of a limited area of the subject can be built up at first hand
by the pupils' own effortsM (NuffieJd foundation, 1967, p. 2). While students arc
encouraged to discuss methods ofinvesligating the various problems in the course, once
the method is agreed, the students are directed to their lab books which describe the
previously rormulaterl method for doing the investigation -. an indication of how small
the role that the student plays in making these decisions and how much leading the
teacher does. It soon becomes obvious that the discovery learning of~ and
~ arc nOI the same thing. With more emphasis on the discovery of accepted
scientific knowledge and less on inquiry skills, the teacher must make sure that students
discover the correct concepts. Hodson (1990) is critical of the discovery approach for
this reason:
The real source of the problem is that teachers pretend to children that the
purpose of such lessons is to engage in scientific enquiry (to 'discover'), when
the real purpose is to promote the acquisition of particular scientific knowledge
(the 'established facts'). (p. 37)
Any results that are unanticipated or misinterpreted, Hodson continues, may lead
children to discover an alternative science. The usual response is to inform
children that they have got the 'wrong result', This instils a concern with what
'ought to happen' and a preoccupation with the 'right answer', It also projects
the view that scientists know well in advance the results of the experiments
they conduct. (p. 31)
Thus discovery learning in secondary science is much more guided than in
"
elementary schools; experiments are devised to illustrate specific scientific concepts.
and, while students are involved in much hands-on activities and no doubt learn a grC:l!
many laboratory skills and le<:hniques, the similarity between scicntitic activity ,inti
science education is very small. Instead of encouraging intellectual indcpcruJcncc.
students may become overly dependent on the teacher and textbook 10 divulge right
answers, and may exhibit a lack of confidence in their own abilities to inquire.
Science fairs provide some of the infrequent opportunities for secondary science
students to engage in an autonomous inquiry/discovery activity. Students have \1)
develop a problem, devise and execute their own experimental method for sulving it or
studying it, and write a report or display lhcir results to either their tcacher, d'L~S,
and/or judges. Two of the main objectives in science fairs arc for sludents 10 imit:llc
scientists as they do their projects, and "if they are effectively to oomplemcntlhe towl
science education program ora school, [science projects exhibited in rairsl should renL'C1
the nature of science... " (Stedman, 1975). These objectives are reneclcd in the criteri'l
that are suggested that judges use when evaluating the students work (Carlisle & Deeter,
1989; Hamrick & Harty, 1983; McBurney, 1978; Stedman, 1975), whieh usually
include an evaluation of the students' illustration of hypotheses, procedures,
interpretations, and conclusions.
Thus, while students are given the opportunity to inquire and discover scientific
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knowledge for themselves, and gain an appreciation for the work of scientists and the
nature of science, lhey must do so within the conslrainu of the criteria of the judges and
an outdated version of the scientific method in order to score well. According to some
writers (Blume, 1985; Smith, 1980; Stedman. 1975), science fair projects should be
experimcnlal in nature if they are to portray the real nature of science and to give
students practice at critical thinking. Model building, displays of information, or
demonstrations of principles do not fare as well as exhibits that use the 'scientific
method', e"'cn though for many scientists, like marine biologists and astronomers, model
building and collecting information is one of their main activities. Thus discovery in
a science fair usually means that the discovery has to be experimental.
A second criticism of science fairs is that they are too competitive (Bunch, 1983;
McBride & Silverman, 1988). However, this competition could be likened to the
influence that awards, grants and fellowships have on scientists. Opportunities for
expanding the students' understanding of the motivation for scientific Yt'Ork would be
expanded by discussions around this theme.
A third criticism of science fairs is that the projects are often the work of parents
or teachers, and not the result of scientific thought on the pan of the student. Thus,
while science fairs ideally have potential for getting students at all ages exploring and
investigating problems on their own, the takeover of projects by parents and teachers
may often result in critical thinking skills not being encouraged.
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A Process Aporoach
Teaching inquiry in a more teacher~ or textbook-directed manner, sometimes c;lllcd
a 'process approach' to science, is another approach to laboratory work thilt gainl..'t.l
prominence in the early 1960's and is still used today. Using Ihis method. the activities
of scientists arc analyzed and categorized into separate 'processes' such as observing and
quantifying. These scientific processes arc then taughllo the students, usually one al
a lime or with one process as the main focus, in a laboratory setting. Suhsequently.
laboratory activities thai integrate all or most of the processes arc done by silldcnl.~. 1\\
this point the whole scientific method is thought to be conslmclcd lind acquin.'(1.
Advocates of this approach can be qui!e explicit about their intent in teaching science
using this method. Gagne (1965), in describing the usc of Science - A Prt"ICess
~ (American Association for Advancement in Science (AAAS), 1970), likens
teachers and students using this curriculum to participants in an experiment - ~an
experiment which itself attempts to follow and to usc the methods of scicnce~ (p.I).
The hypotheses of this experiment
represent a serious and systematic view of how scientilic capabilities may he
developed within the human individual. of how he can becomc an adult who
is attuned to the complexities ofknowlcdge which represcnt our 'scientific' way
of understanding the modern world. (p.l)
Three objectives for science education arc to be met in Science. A Proem
~: vocational, citizenship and self-fulfilment. Thus, this coursc allcmpts 10 help
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students become scientists, and to foster an understanding of the ways of science and an
appreciation of science. The processes of science that are identified are: observing,
classifying, measuring, communicating, quantifying, organizing through space and time,
making inferences and predictions, making operational definitions, formulating testable
hypotheses, carrying out experiments, and interpreting data from experiments. As one
of its key premises, at the end of instruction in the processes of science, Gagne asserts
thaI sludents should be able to understand the works of scientists, after a listening 10
brief descriptions of theiT experiments.
Gagne also asserts that after leaming science using Science - A Process APProach,
any additional instruction in science should take only half as long, although he provides
no reason for why this should be, or evidence that it is so.
Teaching the nature of science using a process approach is supposed to encourage
intellectual independence in two ways. First, since all scientists are supposed 10 use the
same processes in similar ways, students should be able to undersland the reasons and
evidence for scientific knowlcdgeclaims by discussing the matter briefly with a scientist,
as Gagne claims. Second, by knowing and using the processes of science, students
should be able to solve problems for themselves, that is, they should have a strategy for
analyzing and generating their own knowledge. Armed with the processes of science,
students should be able independently to assess any situation.
However. the encouragement of intellectual independence using a process approach
alone is problematic. The main problem is that acquired skills are not much use if
knOWledge is lacking. For instance, knowing the processes of science does not
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necessarily enable one to comprehend the evidence that is generated by them. Having
skill in observation techniques does not enable a student to analyze the spectra frolll an
infrared spectrometer. Thus, it is unlikely thaI a student could understand the reasons
and evidence that support many scientific knowledge claims simply by di£cu5sing bricny
the matter with a scientist. It would be equally unlikely for students 10 usc these process
skills 10 solve problems in spectrometry.
Constructivist-Motivated Laboratories
A recent approach to laboratory work has been developed using a theory of
knowledge called "constructivism". Broadly defined, constructivism is the process
·whereby individuals through their own mental activity, experience with the
environment and social interactions progressively build up and restructL:rc their scheme.~
of the world around themM (Driver, 1989, p. 85). Scicnce, as a rcsull of idc;l~
undergoing publication and being "validaledM by the scientific community, is socially
as well as personally constructed. Thus, scientists have. a shared vicw of the worltl
involving concepts, models and procedures. Learning science, Driver asserts, involves
being initiated into the culture of science. Herein lies the distinction between discovery
learning and a constructivist approach:
If knowledge construction is seen solely as a personal process, then this is
similar to what has traditionally been idcnlificd as discovery learning. If,
however, learners are to be given acccss to the knowledge systems of science,
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the process of knowledge construction must go beyond personal empirical
enquiry. wrners need to be given access not only to physical experiences but
also to the concepts and models of conventional science. The challenge lies in
helping learners 10 construct these models for themselves, to appreciate their
domains of applicability and, within such domains. to be able 10 use them.
(Driver, 1989, p. 85)
A constructivist laboratory approach would take into account the child's eltpcriences
and preconceptions aheM science and attempt \0 encourage or change these conceptions
to conventional scientific ideas through presentations ofdiscrepant events (Carey, Evans,
Honda, Jay & Unger, 1988; Driver, 1989; Driver &. Bell, 1986). These events show
inadequacies in the students' conceptioils and force them to change their theories to
morc acceptable ones. Thus, while recognizing that knowledge is constructed
individually, students arc led to hold views thai correspond to currenlly accepted views.
Justifications for using a constructivist approach to laboratory work primarily
concern increased understanding of scientific content and fostering conceptual change.
Carey, el al. (1988) justify using a constructivist approach also as a means of
understanding the nature of scientific knowledge and reasoning: "We believe that
students must learn to reason critically about scientific knowledge. It is crucial that
studenlS understand that the body of scientific knowledge... is constructed and changing,
rather than 'the truth'" (Carey, et al.. 1988, p. I). The conceptual change that Carey,
et al., propose in using a constructivist approach is not only content oriented, it also
concern:> scientific epistemology:
(,(,
Students' initial epistemological stance concerning scientific knowledge is tn,ll
knowledge is a passively acquired, faithful copy of the world, and all onc must
do is find it by looking in the right places. In order for students to mow
beyond this conception, we believe that Ihey must have upportunities to beCOllle
actively engaged in construction and evaluating explanations for nalliral
phenomena. (Carey. et aI., 1988, p. 2)
Constructivism, thcn, focuses on students' evaluating their own ,\l,c1icfs aboll!
scientific concepts and theories, testing them, and attempting to come up wilh more
accurate conceptions. Students can accept new scientific knowledg.e only when they arc
convir.ced that their own conceptions arc inadequate, and sec thc body of evidence IIml
supports the more acceptable conception.
~ Laboralory Approaches
The laOoi'3tory approaches described above havc 'many commonalities and
differences. All the approaches advocatt' pUlling experiment bcfore theory, tll:lI is,
having the students discover scientific knowledge claims by lhemselves. A.~ such, all
of these approaches emphasize scientific knowledge generation and acquisition by
experimenting, or by confirming or discovering the scientific knowledge claim first
hand. With these approaches. trust would not be even considered as a pan (If scicncc,
since the focus in ex.periments is to determine the evidencc and reasons for oncself.
Second, with approaches that emphasize knOWledge generation, teaching a scientific
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method or a means for generating reliablt: scientific knowledge is stressed. The
resulting scientific knowledge is usually thought of as being proven; without an inquiry
or constructivist emphasis that stresses the constructed or intclllTetive nature of scientific
knowledge, the tenlalive nalure of scientific knowledge is not emphasized. In this way,
teaching the nalure of science using the laboratory may have J.imilar outcomes to
teaching the nature of science using a history of science that includes only names, dates,
and experimental details. That is. both approaches stress the evidence that supports
scientific knowledge claims and the rationality of science. Students may not feel it
appropriate 10 question such knowledge claims with such undisputable evidence
supporting them.
Third, laboratory approaches that emphasize the processes and logic of scientific
knowledge generation and problem-solving are justified as providing a means to
intellectual independence and critical thinking. By providing models of scientific
activity, or by having students inquire into discrcpam events, the means to solve or
analyze future problems or scientific knowledge claims is learned. This is typified by
Gagne's slatement about the ability of students to understand the work of any scientists
after hearing a brief description, once they understand the processes of science. The
scientific method, once mastered. is seen as the key to understanding the w('rk of
scientists and to independent problem-solving.
Fourth, if more than just the evidence and results were to be discussed, laboratory
approaches could have a great deal of potential for illustrating the role of tnlst in
science. Scientific ethics, accurate reporting of results, using the teacher and other
.,
students as examples of the peer review system, doing experimental work that relics Oil
teams of students working together on different segments of Ihe projcct (even in
different scientific disciplines) and the explicit usc of scientific knowledge that is
unconfirmed by the students to generate morc scientific knowledge. would illustmtc lhe
prevalence of trust in science. Even one of lhe greatest disadvantages of discovery
approaches, that of students' obsession with discovering Ihc ~righl" answer, Ct\uld he
used 10 illustrate the dogmatism and authoritarianism Ihat is prevalent in science as
opposed to the reliance on evidence and rcason. Norris (1984) describes how lI\;\ny
prominent philosophers (Kuhn, Popper. Lakatos) sec a need for dognmtism in science.
and concludes:
If they [the students] are to be given an accurate view of the nature of science,
then it might be necessary to show them instead the vital role that dllgl1lOllic
positions play in furthering science. In this approach, dogmatism would be ellS!
not so much as an evil to avoid bUI as a necessary stance which human beings
must adopt in their attempt to gain new knowlcdgl. (p. 490)
However, mosllabwork done in school is done on a individual basi.~ with the emphasis
on individual autonomy, not on commuoal consensus.
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The Philosophy of Science
A third approach to teaching the nature of science is to teach, either explicitly or
implicitly, philosophy of sc;en('(:. While much has been written on the necessity of
studcnls' being educated in the philosophy of science, there is little consensus among
the authors about what is to be taught. It is common to read one article strongly
advocating a realist perspective of scientific theories while denouncing the instrumental
position, Ihen 10 read a second article that advocates just the opposite. It is also
common for authors to hold positions that arc intermediate 10 opposing views, and for
hybrid positions to arise.
The most common foci in teaching the philosophy of science include instruction in
the methods of scientists and how science progresses, the nature of scientific theories,
and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this section a brief outline of some of the
more prevalent positions in each of these areas will be analyzed to see whether holding
these positions offers any means of attaining intellectual jn,kpendence or fostering
-:ritical thinking.
The Progressjon (or NQoprogressjon) of Science
In this section common views on how science progresses will be analyzed. These
will include inductivisl and falsificationist positions. as well as the positions of Kuhn and
...
Feyerabend. These analyses will be brief and undoubtedly incomplete. and. as slaled
above, arc not meant 10 describe all the different positions on how science progresses.
~. In this view of the progression of science and the gCllcmtion Ill'
scientific knowledge, scientists record their unprejudiced objcctive obscrvalion.~. and
from a large number of these theory-free observations develop gcncralii·.atltlllS. llr
universal laws. Science progresses
as the number of facts established by observation and experiment grows, and
as the facts become more relined and esoteric due 10 improvements in our
observational and experimental skills, so more and more Jaws and theories of
every more generality and scope arc constructed by careful inductive rcastllling.
The growth of science is continuous, ever onward and upward, as the fund uf
observational data is increased. (Chalmers, 1982, p.5)
Inductive generalizations, because they ca~l ~ falsified by just onc contrary observation.
must be held as tentative, and cannot be proven truc.
Most philosophers of science do not think lhat the ioductivisl view of ...dcntific
progress is accurale, It holds thai scientific observation is complelely thenry- ,md
prejudice- free, and is the starling point of experimental work. Philosophers such a.~
Hanson (958) and Kuhn (1962) have shown convincingly how thr.'ory inlluencc.'i
observation, and have maintained that, contrary to the inductivisl position, theory
precr.A:les observation.
The inductivisl view of lhe progress of science has long been discarded hy mml
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philosophers of science. Yet many science curricula have laboratory experiments that
are based on generating scientific knowledge using inductive generalization, and the
theory-free nature of observation statements is widely proclaimed in students'
laboratories advising them to separate observation statements from inferences, and to
observe objcctively. While (ew, ifany, current authors in the field of science education
advocate this view of the progre~sion of science, its presence is still evident in
laboratory manuals and science textbooks.
Ei!.sificatjoDism. Karl Popper advocated this view of the progression of science with
his book The logic of scientific djscovery (1959). He maintained that science advances
by scientific theories being proposed by scientists who then attempted to falsify them.
Scientific knowledge was generated by making predictions based on the proposed
theories; if evidence arose that was contrary to the theories. they would be discarded.
Chalmers (1982) depicts the progression of science according to the falsification position
as such;
Only the fittest theories survive. While it can never be legitimately said of a
theory that it is true, it can hopefUlly be said that it is the best available, that
it is better than anything that has come before. (p. 38)
The falsificationist view of the progress of science still has a lot of support from
many philosophers of science. Its premise that scientific knowledge must always be
written in a form that is teslable by evidence or observation is often used to demarcate
scientific knowledge from other forms of knowledge. By holding all scientific
'"knowledge claims u potentially falsifiable, this view also cmphasius the tcnlali,'c nalurI:
of scientific knowledge, which is an area of concern for llWly science educators. In
order for students to mink critically about science. and not view scientific Imowlcdg~'
as absolute and beyond reproach. they must hold a Il':ltativc view of scicntilic
knowledge.
Kuhn's PQsition. lOOmas Kuhn advanced a theory of the progression of scicnce
based on the views thaI scientists throughout history had nOllded lu falsify the thl..'wil.'s
Ihal had been proposed. and that theories were not always discarded in the flU':C "f
conflicting evidence. On lhe contrary. scienlists tended to hold onto th\.'urics. ignllrc
anomalies. and promote theory change only when cooIIgh anomalies aceurnulall'(l III
force a scientific crisis and when a theory had bttn pl'OfIOscd lhal would account for the
anomalies. Thus. science had two phases. Normal science occurs when work i~ thllle
to expand scientific knowledge according 10 the existing scientific paradigm. (1\
paradigm can be thought of as lIIe general theoretical assumptions, laws anti rnetlMKls
thatlhe scientific community adopt.) Kuhn referred to this activity as ·pulzle solving-.
During the period of normal science, scientisb arc uncritical of the [J3radigm so that as
much knowledge can be gained from it as possible. I\s anomalies begin to aCCUl11ul;lle,
a period of revolutionary, or extraordinary, science follows. In this stage, the
underlying assumptions of the existing paradigm arc questioned and a new thenry
proposed with different assumptions. In many cases, the old and new theoril's arc
incompatible, or as Kuhn described, incommensurable. Since the rival theories ',;ive
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different underlying assumptions, theory change is a very complex process, since what
is legitimate or meaningful to one paradigm may oe meaningless to its rival. Chalmers
(1982) stales: -the kinds of factors that do prove effective in causing scientists to change
paradigms is a matter to be discovered by psychological and sociological investigation"
(p. 97). This theory of the progression of science has become increasingly popular and
has caused many philcsophical debates. However, il has not gained prominence in
science curricula, perhaps due to the depiction of theory-change being an partly
irrational and relativistic process.
Fcycrabend's Position. An anarchistic change theory was advanced by Paul
Feyerabcnd. He denounced all previous methodologies of science and made his
renowned statement, W All methodologies have their limitations and the only wrule" that
survives is 'anything goes'" (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 296). He studied the history of
science and held that there was no one set of rules that guided scientists in matters of
theory choice. He also held that rival theories may be incommensurable since
in some cases the fundamental principles of two rival theories may be so
radically different that it is not possible even to formulate the basic concepts
of one theory in terms of the other with the consequence that the two rivals do
not share any observation statements. In such cases it is not possible to
compare the rival theories logically. (Chalmers, 1982, p. 137)
Feyerabend also holds that science is not superior to other forms of knowing, such
as magic or astrology. Since they have different underlying assumptions, they are
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incommensurable, and therefore incomparable. He is a strong advocate of individual
freedom, be it freedom to choose the method one walliS or freedom to choose hClwl'Cll
science and other forms of knowledge.
5..um.min'.. While each view of the progression of science has vastly diffcrcrll
emphases, justifications for teaching them do have something in common. All the views
try to impart a picture of how scientific knowledge is subject 10 revision. Nonc of the
views intend to portray the view that scientific knowlctlgc is true or st,llic, hUI is
changing and growing as our means of experimenting have cKpandL'd.
lnductivist and falsificalionist views of science lend to cmphasi7.c the r.llimml side
of science; the experimental evidence for scientific theories and the means for geller-Iling
reliable scientific knowledge are stressed, while personal or social faclors are ignuTl'tf.
Scientific thinking using a .scientilic approach or mcthod, may bc onc of the intended
outcomes of these approaches.
More recent views on the progression of science, as exemplilicd by Kuhn .111J
Feyerabend, emphasize the relative and perhaps nonralional nature of theory change,
and thus emphasize even more the tentalive nature of scientiFic knowledge. These views
hold thaI many theories are incommensurable, and, as such, analy7.ing thc evidence and
reasons supporting them is inadequate as a melhod for assessing the soundness and
acceptability of a scientific knowledge claim. This can be done only by a communily
of .scientists, and decisions arc influenced by societal, economic and personal facltlrs.
All of these factors would need 10 be considered by sludents in analyzing past scientific
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theory change. Analyzing the soundness of scientific theories being put forward today
or in the future, however, is too complex a process to be done by one individual. To
assume that it could be undertaken by one person is to misrepresent the way scientific
theories are accepted and assessed, according to Kuhn and Feycrabend,
The Nature of Scientific Theories
A second aspect that is commonly the focus of instruction in the philosophy of
science is thai of the nature of scientific theories. There seem to be two extreme and
opposing positions in this debate, each one with strong advocates. These are realism
and instrumentalism. These views will be discussed here briefly, as well as a hybrid
position put forward by Hodson (1982), again with the intention of analyzing the ability
ofinslruction in Ihis matler to increase students' critical thinking abilities and intellectual
independence.
~. This view of the nature of scientific theories holds that scientific theories
describe what the world is really like. The entities described in scientific theories, like
electrons, molecules, and magnetic fields, have actual ontological status. The aim of
science is 10 get better, more accurate and true descriptions of the world.
~. According toan instrumentalist, scientific theories do not describe
the world as it actually is: th~ries arc "nothing morc than sets of rules (or connecting
7()
one set of ob~rvable phenomena with another" (Chalmers. 1982. p. 148).
Instrumentalists hold that there is a difference between observable enlilies anllthcmctical
concepts; while observable entities are given ontological status, theoretical concepts arc
not. The products of science (theories) are not viewed as right or wrong, instead they
are judged by their usefulness in connecting to observations.
Hodson's position. Hodson describes a view of the nature of scientilic theories Ihilt
is intermediate to realism and instrumentalism. In this view, sOlile theories have
instrumental status, or are nOlhing more Ihan useful models, but as more ,md more
evidence corroborates these models they lake on a realistic status. He stillcs Ihilt -1\
realist can be realist about some theories (those which he belicycs 10 be truc) :lntl
instrumentalist about others, which he finds useful bUI not true (i.e. thenrelic,,1
models)... "(1982, p. 25). The job of educators and textbooks, in his view. i.~ III lei
students know the status of theories so they will able to judge appropriately the nature
of the various theories as models or depictions of reality.
~. The instrumentalist and realist views or thc nature of scicnlilic thcorics
seem direclly to oppose one another, and a consensus about which view is the hesl is
not imminent. Many writers (Selley, 1989, and Chalmers, 1982, forexamplc) advocate
intermediate positions. Teaching one or even several views would serve 10 encouragc
students to evaluate just what the theories arc supposed \0 represent Howcver, they
would not be in a position to evaluate which position most accurately portrays scientific
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theories. Both views hold that scientific knowledge is subject to revision: realists would
revise their theories as technological advances allow different perspectives about reality,
and instrumentalists as new modrls or theories connect to a wider variety of
observations.
The Nature of Scientific Knowledge
There arc several terms used in describing the nature of scientific knowledge.
Many of the terms are rdated; they afe not meant to be mutually exclusive, Some
commonly used terms in discussing scientific knowledge arc "objective", ·constructed",
"individual", "subjective". "consensual", "rational", "relative", "absolute" and
"lentalive". These terms will be discussed briefly in this section in order to see whether
different perspectives 011 the nature of scientific knowledge encourage critical thinking
and intellcttual independence.
One way scientific knowledge can be conceived of is as 2b.L~. This is a view
that Mstresscs that items of knowledge, from simple propositions to complex theories,
have properties and characteristics that transcend the beliefs and states of awareness of
the individuals that devise and contemplate them" (Chalmers, 1982, p. 113). That is,
theoretical constructions are thought to represent entities that exist independently of the
knower, and have properties that may go beyond what was originally intended when
they were postulated. This view has support in explaining how consequences not
thought of originally can result from scientific theories. Chalmers uses the example of
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Poisson's discovery of a bright Spol, a consequence of Fresnel's wave theory of which
Fresnel was unaware, to
provide persuasive evidence for the view that scientific theories have an
objective structure outside of the minds of individual scientists and have
properties that mayor may not be discovered or produced and mayor lIlay nol
be properly understood by individual scientists or groups of scientist. (p. 117)
Threerelatedtermsare~,~or~. SciCIIlifk knowledge.
if described using these terms, is dependent on the knower and is belief under'sl!)!.)!.( as
a set of beliefs that the sci~ntist has. Confrcy's (1990) view of knOWledge lypilic.~ these
terms. She states that
all knowledge is necessarily a product of Ol« own cognitive acls. We can howe
no direct or unmcdilaled knowledge of any external Of objective reality. We
construct our understanding through our experiences, and the character of Ilur
experience is influenced profoundly by our cognitive lens, (p. lOti)
The way scientific knowledge is socially constructed provides some support ror a
constructivist or subjectivist view of scientific knowledge. Glascrsfeld (1991) arglle.~
this point when he asserts,
the fact that we dQ agree on certain things and that we !dl!l communicate docs
not prove Ihal what wecxpericnce has~ in itself. Irlwo people
or even a whole society of people look through distorting lenses and agree on
what they see, this does nol make what they sec any more ~ • it merely
means that on the basis of such agreements they can build up a consensus on
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certain areas of their subjective experiential worlds. (p.xv)
Thus the various scientific knowledge claims, according to these views, will have
different meanings for different scientists, depending on their beliefs and experiences.
Another term used to describe a view of scientific knowledge is~.
Knowledge is generated, justified and held by communities of scientists. It is not up to
individual scientists, according :'1 this view, to judge the soundness of a knowledge
claim:
Recent work in the sociology of science has shown with a wealth of detaillhat
the standards of the asscssmelll of the worth of scientific products are located
in and peculiar 10 quile specific communities ... Science is a communal practice
with communal standards of good work." (Harre, 1986, p. 13)
In order for a scientific knowledge claim to be accepted it must meet the standards
of a scicntilic community, Scientists are "fundamentally and vitally dependent upon the
good will of those praclitioners within the area who set the standards not only of
acceptability but ?.Iso of plausibility" (Code, 1987, p. 232), Thus a consensus among
thc scientific community about the worth of a scientific knowledge claim is necessary
for its acceptance as valid scientific knowledge. The evidence necessary to judge the
claim must meel the communal standards sct by the community of scientists.
A term that is sometimes used in conjunction with the term ·objective" is ra.ti.2ruI.l,
This view of scientific knowledge holds that there are universill criteria that can be used
to judge whether a theory is good or bad. A gt>x1 theory, according 10 this view, does
not depend upon social. historical or economic conditions; it can assessed without
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reference to these factors. Siegel (1989) strongly argues for the view of science as "
rational process: ~What insures thai rationality is the commitment 10 evidence . or.
better, science is rational to the extent that il proceeds in accordance with such ,I
commitment" (p. 14). This view treats scientific evidence as ahistorical, ahle (tl l~
assessed on its own worth at any time.
Contrary to this is the view that scientific knowledge is rdiI.i.B::. This view hnlus that
theories cannot be assessed as good or bad, for ·what counls as hellef or wurst: wilh
respect to scientific theories will vary from individual to individual or from cnmmunily
to community. The aim of knowledge-seeking will depend on what is imporlant for or
what is valued by the individual or community in question.• (Chalmers, 19H2. p.I(2).
Any analysis of any scientific knowledge is not complele. according 10 this view. until
all social, hislorical and economic factors have been assessed. 'nlUS a good tln.'ory is
judged on the basis of how useful it is loa particular community. nut on .'>OlIIe universal
criteria.
Controversy about which of the above terms best portrays scientific knowledge is
common among many philosophers of scicnce and science educators. The final pair (If
opposing terms used 10 describe scientific knowledge,~ and i!l!m!..IJ..ll.. om:
probably the only terms upon which a consensus has been reached (Ennis, 1979). A
view that scientific knowledge is lentative would hold Ihat scientific knuwledge i.\
constantly changing and undergoing revision, whereas a view that holds scicntilic
knowledge as absolute would view it as static, unchanging and final. On this point.
science educators and philosoph::rs are agreed: scicntific knowledge is tentative (Ennis.
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1979).
In summary, instruction in the nature of scicnlil1c knowledge, as in the OIher areas
of the philosophy of science, seems to have lillie consensus and much diversity. One
could portray scientific knowlc.1ge as rational and objective, with a focus on the
expcrimcnlal evidence that justifies scientific knowledge. This portrayal may be more
common when the desired OLitcomes of science education are promoting conceptual
change to accepted scientific beliefs, achieving a good undcrsl.anding of the rational
ba~is for current scientific knowledge, andlor increasing the ability to assess the reasons
(or theory changes. Student could be said to be intellectually independent when they
understand and can assess for themselves the evidence for scientific knowledge claims.
On the other hand, one could portray scientific knowledge as individual, eonstnleted
and relativistic. The emphasis in these accounts on the thcory-ladcn nalure of
observation, and on the need to take factors ot!ler than e~perimental evidence into
consideration when assessing scientil'ie knowledge claims, encourage a more humanistic
and non rational view of science. This would probably be more common when the
emphasis in science in~truction is on tentativeness ;n science, questioning the products
of science, or the portrayal of the humanistic, social and perhaps nonrnlional side of
~icncc. These views of scientific knowledge may enhance the students' critical
dispositions towards scientific knowledge.
It is important to realize that somc of the views of scientific knOWledge hold that
individuals cannot assess the soundness of a scientific knowledge claim. Holding a
consensual view of scientific knowledge would view the scientific community as the
assessors of scientific knowledge. Relativistic vicws of scientific knowkdge hl,lt1thou
any assessment of scientific knowledge will depend upon social and f..'C()l1olllk· [aclllrs;
the evidence used in assessing knowledge claims is only one factor to be taken illln
account in the assessment. If intellectual independence. or the ability to assess the
soundncss of scientific knowledgc claims on onc's own, is a goal of science eJucillillll,
then these views of scientific knowledge would probably not be conveyed 10 .~'lltrclltS.
Thus, while these views would hold that intelleclual independence is IItl! fltlssihle li,r
science students, or scientists for that maHer, they would encourage a mOTe sceptic:alllr
tentative view of science, since they portray the social and economic factors thill must
be assessed along with the scientific cvidcncc.
In this section, ways of viewing scientific knowledgc have been Jescrihed. Nil
attempt to analyze how scientific knowledge is actually conveyl,.'(] to sluuents ha.~ heell
undertaken. Thus, while some philosophical views of the nmure of .~ciclllitk
knowledge, such as the conscnsus view, do acknowledge the rolc of trust antJ tcstimllny
in science, it is uncertain whether these views arc being imparted 10 students. I .~lJsfll-'Ct
that they are not; however without any curriculum analysis or cmpirical SlllUY uf tile
philosophical content of science ('lasses, this suspicion is unconfirmcd. Philnsophic;11
discussions on the nature of scientific knowlcdgcdo seem 10 have /Xllcntial ror imparling
a view of the role of trust and testimony in acquiring scientific knowledge.
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S'{QWis of 'he Three ApprOicb!;$ '91j:;achjng
the Nature of Science
This chapter presented three approaches (0 leaching the nature of science 10
students, namely, using the history of science. laboratory activities, and the philosophy
of sciencc. With the ClI.ccption of the approach 10 leaching the history of science by
giving only the names. dales and discoveries of scientists, all approaches focus on the
analysis of the evidence and reasons that support scientific knowledge claims. and the
methods that scicnlist.~ usc to generate and justify their knowledge claims. Each
approach also holds different cJIlpcctalions about how students may be able [0 achieve
intellectual independence and critical thinking skill!'. These expectations will be
examined in the next chapler and juxtaposed with the assertions regarding the
interdependence of scientists, epistemic dependence and necessity of trust in science.
Chapter Five
Conclusions
Teaching the nature of science as a means of achicving intellectUill inucllCndcrll'c
and increased critical thinking abilities has been shown to be a long-slanding goal (If
science education. However, the ability to be intcllectually independent am] to he ahle
to think critically about scientilic knowledge is questiollL'<.I hy Hardwig, as wdl liS
others, who argue thai there are many inSlances in which all people arc IlL'Ces.'iilrily
epistemically dependent on scientists. DiO'crent approaches 10 tcaching the nature til
science were examined for their IKIrtrayal of scientirie epislemologies :\Ill! til scc the
means that they offer for achieving intellectual independence and crilicalthinking skills.
In this chapler the expectations about students' abilities to achievc intclkctual
independence and critical thinking skills are juxtapoSl'<.l with the cpi.~tell1ic <kpendcrll.:c
claims made by people like Hardwig, Broad and Wade, and Siegel, in an effort to .Sl.:C
if there is any way in which students can have independence over, or think critically
aboul, scientific knowledge claims. In the final chapler. the implications of cpiSlclllil.:
dependence for teaching the nature of science are addressed.
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EXOCCla'ioos of Intellectual Independence
and Crilica! Thinking Abilities
The examination of the various approaches to teaching the nature of science in the
previous chapter shows at least fOUT ways in which students are expected to achieve
intellectual independence andlor think critically about science. Each of these ways vary
in the amount of independence that the slUdclIls are expected to have over scientific
knowledge claims, from complete to lesser degrees of independence. The ways can be
described as follows:
I. Complete independence: Students are expected to be sceptical of all knowledge claims
and attempt to verify or confirm all knowledge before they accepi it. This position
would involve the students in replicating lhe work of other scientists or discovering
new knowledge on their own. Testimony is not an acceptable means of acquiring
new knowledge in this form of science education.
This expectation of the degree of independence that students would be able to exhibit
is typical of the epistemologies espoused by a laboratory approach to leaching the nature
of science. Discovery and inquiry techniques that emphasize knowledge generation and
problem solving using only the laboratory and first hand experimentation may encourage
this expectation of students. Another approach that may encourage this expectation for
students would be the historical approach in which past experiments are replicated in
'0
order 10 confirm findings. Instruction in the philosophy of science that lends III funIS
on scientific epistemologies thai are based only on experimentation lllay also cnC~lUl'ilgc
this expectation for students.
2, Independence with respect to evidence and reasons: Sludcllls <Ire cxpcCh:tl til
understand or be able to evaluate the reasons or evidence flIT believing scientific
knowledge Claims. 11i;5 position would nol necessarity involve the students' learning
by experiencing first-hand all the cxperimclIls that suppon scientific knuwh,.'(lgc. hUI
would expect that students understand how the experiments arc dUllC and how the
observations arc interpreted, and thus be <lblc to decide whether the jusliric:lliuns lilT
the knowledge claims are sound. Since students would not he doing the ;l(;lUal
experimental work, some testimony would be relied upon, am.! students w(\uld have
to trust that the scientists aetuaily got the results that they did. However, this
reliance on truSl and tcstimony may not be acknowledged by the lcadlcr.\ or tCll,lhnnk.
This second expectation of studcnts is typical in approaches that include historical
accounts of science with details included about experimental work. Instruetiull in thc
philosophy ofscience that portrays science as a rational, objective endeavour would al!iu
emphasize the evidence and reasons for scientific knowledge claims, and may encourage
in students the attitude that one must understand the evidence and reasons for knowledge
claims before one can admit to knowing them.
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3. Independence wjlb respect to the source: Students may nOI underslaIld how scientists
performed the experiments upon which they depend for tbeir scientific knowledge,
but they arc c",peeled to be able to De critical about the source of the knowledge. In
Ihis position, cpistemic dependence upon the expen is acknowledged, but the attempt
rationally to ground beliefs is made by deciding whether the expert is indeed an
expert, whether he or she can be trusted, whether there is any conflict of interest that
may cause the expert to distort what he or she believes, and so on. This expectation
is best described by Siegel (1988).
This expectation may DOl be that common for science students. Scientists are usually
portrayed as beyond reproach and completely trustworthy. Historical accounts of
complex theories may encourage Ihis type of analysis for students. For example, instead
of assessing Einstein's theory of r<:1ativity, or SchrOdinger's wave equation, teachers
may appeal 10 the expertise of Einstein or SchrOdinger. Also, historical accounts of past
scientists that have defrauded the scientific community by publishing distorted or
fabricated results would also encourage students to scrutinize the integrity of scientists
making knowledge claims. Instruction in the philosophy of science that focuscs on the
innucnccs that affect the work of scientists, such as discussions on the pressure to
publish, and the ..:eonomic and social pressures on scientists. may encourage this level
Offlsscssmcnl.
4. Independence with respect !Q judging the certainly of the scientific claim: This
expectation is based on the premise: that students. if they understand how ~cicntilk
knowledge is generated, will hold scientific knowledge as tentative. ndr
independence is exhibited in their willingness to suspend judgement instead llf
dogmatically accepting all scientific knowledge claims as the truth. This expect'llion
takes into account that students may not be able to understand how an experiment
was done or how the resulls were interpreted. They also may not be cap,lhle of
critically analyzing the source of the knowledge claim fo~ a variety of reaMlIlS: the
scientist that performed the experiment could be. long dead or so obscure lhal rdillhk
biographical knowledge on the scienlist is lacking, or the abilily aCCUr.llcly to judge
the charact..r of it scientist may be. undermined by the fact that so lllany reputahle ami
well-respected scientists have committed some form of scientific fraud. The sllldents'
only subject for evaluation is the generic knowledge of the processes of ~cicncc and
the way scientific knowledge is constructed. Scepticism is held about .'iCicntitic
knowledge claims that they are unable to evaluate without any ftlllntlalillll for
disbelief or belief, since they are unable to assess either the source or Ihe reasons and
evidence supporting the knowledge claim. This position is described by Hardwig
(1991) and Broad and Wade (1982).
Many of the approaches to teaching the nature of science hold Ihis expect,tlion for
students. One of the underlying themes of all historical accounts of science concerns
the revisionary nature of scientific knowledge. Laboratory approaches, such as
Schwab's enquiry approach, that emphasize the way that scientific knowledge is
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constructed from the mind of scientists instead of ~diSC()vered" also emphasize the
tentative nature of science. One of the major emphases in instruction in the philosophy
of science is on the tentative nature of scientific knowledge and theories _. one of the
few noncontroversial subjccts ;0 the philosophy of science.
The Attainment of 'nleJIecllljll Independence
and Critical Thinking Abi1ities
Four levels of independence or criticalness have been described in evaluating the
expectations for science students artcr instruction in the nature of science. In this
section, these (ourexpeclations will be evaluated in light of epistemic dependence claims
to see iflhey are reasonable.
Complete Independence
Hardwig (1991) dismisses the ability of students to replicate most of the work of
contemporary, and even past, scientists. He points out, as described in chapter three,
that due to restrictions in time, expertise and expense, replieation is not a feasible
alternativc for most scientists, let alone laypeople. The philosophical basis for this
expectation is not sound, either. Most philosophers now acknowledge that scientific
knowledge is not verified by one individual, but is verified through a complex
interaction among members of the scientific community, and that social and economic
,.
factors playa role. Thus asking students \0 assess the soundness of scientific knowledge
on their own is very unreasonable.
Independence with Respect IQ Evidence and Reasons
For many of the same reason! cited above and ill chapleT IIncc, this CXllCChUhlll
appears unrealistic. Many team research projccts have no one person that knows all the
reasons and evidence for the scientific knowledge claims generated. Laypcoplc 1.1111101
have the necessary expertise to interpret the data thai arc gcnCrlllctl by OIdV,lt1CCII
scientific instruments. Thus for many scientific knowledge claims being made lnd"y.
and even many that have been made in the past, the cllpcctation of achieving
independence by understanding the reasons and evidence that support these claims is
unrealistic.
Independence with Respect IQ the SQ!JTce
This expectation of the level of independence that can still be allaincd cvcn if
evidence and reasons can nOI be understood by a layperson is discussed by Siegel (19K!!)
and Norris (1990). However, Hardwig (1991) and Broad and Wade (1982) cast doubt
on the reliability of this analysis. Respectable and often-published scicnliSls have been
found to be fraudulent, or have fraudulent people working under them with lillIe or no
supervision. Notwithstanding this, the difficulty in obtaining enough information in
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order 10 make a judgement on the credentials of an individual scientist (assuming that
the scientist is working alone) make this approach to achieving independence dubious
al best. Even if a sufficient amount of information about the scientist is available, the
layperson oflen is unable to interpret it.
Indeocndence in Judgjng the Certain~QfScientific Knowledge Claims
Instruction in the nalure of science is oftcnjuslilied as a means to decrease scientism,
-- H a belie( that the scope of scientific authority is unlimited and beyond reproach"
(Uuschl. 1988, p. 52). Holding a tentative view of scientific knowledge is necessary
for Ihis. Since the evidence and reasons thai support scientific knowledge claims, and
the character and competency of the source, do not need to be analyzed in order to hold
a tentative view of science, this very limited degree of independence is attainable.
Students remain largely epislemieally dependent on the scientific experts, however, and
have limited means for qu("stioning scientific knowledge claims. They are aware only
that the knowledge claims could be revised later.
However, simply holding a tentative view of science is not sufficient for thinking
critically about science. In order (0 think critically about science, one must have both
the ability and the disposition. In many instances, the analysis of the evidence, reasons,
and source of scientific knowledge is beyond the level of expertise of the student. Since
this analysis is necessary for thinking critically about science, students cannot think
critically about knowledge claims in such situations. In holding a tentative view of
"
scientific knowledge, students may have a disposition to think critically abol.ll sckncc.
but not the ability.
Instruction in the nature of science may result in students being capable of achicvin~
an independence in judging the certainty of scientific knowledge claims. By knowing
that scientific knowledge is not proven or truc. bul is subject to change. they will 1101
accept dogmatically every scientific pronouncement as the Iiteml truth. Holding a
tentative view of science may increase a student's disposition to think Criticlllly 'tmllli
science, (0 make a student more likely 10 question the evidence, reasons and 1111.:
competence of the source. However, instruction in the nalure of science is unlikely til
enhance the ability to think critically about science.
Chaptcr Six
Implications
It was concluded in the last chaptcr that instruction in the nature of science Illay he
effective in providing a means for students \0 achieve an independence in judging Ihe
certainty of knowledge claims, that is, students m:ly not necessarily holt! all .'il:ie111ifk
knowledge to be true or proven but instead Illay hold such knowledge to he tenl:ltive.
Holding this view of the nature of scientific knowledge may increasc .~tlldenls·
disposition towards thinking critically about science. but will not ncccss,lrily inereasc
their ability to do so. Without the ability to analyze and assess the soundness Ill'
scientific knowledge claims, students will be epistemically dependent on :;cicnlists fllr
much of their scientific knowlcdge.
These conclusions have several implications for scicnce education and irl.~trtlctinl1 ill
the nalure of science. In this chapter, implications regarding the epistcllllllogies
espoused in teaching the nature of science, justifications for teaching the nature uf
science, and instruction in scientific ethics will bc discussed.
Scientific Epistemologies
Hardwig (1985 & 1991), Polanyi (1946) Broad and Wade (1982), and Code (19M?)
all have concluded that trust and reliance on testimony arc necessarily a part of .-;cicntc
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knowledge acquisition. Any instruction in the nature of science should acknowledge the
interdependence of scientists, scientists' own epistcmic dependence in areas outside their
expertise, and the lack of replication in science. However, approaches to teaching the
nature of science still emphasize the role of experimentation, the analysis of reasons and
evidence in scientific epistemology, and theprincip1e of replication. Historical accounts
offer details of experiments that lead to famous discoveries, laboratory approaches offer
instruction in generating and justifying scientific knowledge claims, and instruction in
lhe philosophy of science emphasizes the role of cxperiment<.tion in the progress of
science, as well as the status of tho: products of these experiments. or course, these
ways of knowing do play an important and pivotal role in scientific knowledge
generation and justil'ication. However, testimony alY.:l plays a moUor role when it comes
both to knowledge generation and acquisition. The distinction between scientific
knowledge generation, justification, and acquisition needs to be madc in order to portray
accurately the nature ofscicnce.
All three approaches to teaching the nature of science. that is, teaching the history
of science, using a laboratory approach and teaching the philosophy of science. have
potential as means to portray the role of trust and the reliance on testimony in science.
Historical accounts thai show how scientists frequently used the results of other scientists
instead of verifying them for themselves would serve to illustrate the role of trust, as
well as accounts of how some scientists have been found to betray the trust of the
scientific community by publishing forged or distorted results. In this way the
advantages and pitfalls of trusting the testimony of scientists are portrayed. For
example. science can be shown to progress efficiently and effectively if scientists do not
H9
have to start from scratch every time they do research, and people would bcndit frum
tcchnological advances and scientific research lhal Ihey lIlay not understand. The
disadvantages arc also portrayed by illustrating the cases of rcsC3rch fraud. H\lWC\lCT,
while these should serve as a warning about the way lhallrust can be betrayed. the l"rgc
amount of reliable research lhat is done relative 10 the occurrence of scicntilic fmml
should be conveyed 10 students so that they will not become overly sceptical or cynic,,1
about science. It should be shown that the advantages of relying on testimony oUlweigh
the disadvantages, Ihal 10 reject all scientific knowledge hecausc it is ha.~ 11111 hL'C1l
personally confirmed would mean regressing to the slone age.
Laboratory approaches also have potential for illustrating the mle or trust and the
reliance on testimony. Using the results from instruments that opcmtc in 11l.lIlllerS
beyond the expertise of the students docs not stop the studcnts from \lsin!? thcm; the
students must rely on manufacturers' and their teachers' testimony Ih"t they give the
results that Ihey arc supposed to. (The tcachers themselves may nol understand cxnctly
how the instruments work.) The process of writing reports may be likenoo \0 suhrnilling
an article to be published, in that the tcachcr must trust that the students aclllally
obtained the results that they said they did. Working in learns with each lIlcmhcr
responsible for collecting different d"'ta would ",Iso scrvc 10 iIluslrnlc the intcrdependencc
of scientists. Teachers also should emphasise that the main role in eXflCrimcnt<llinn is
in scientific knowledge generation and justific"'tion, but is not Ihe primary means used
in scientific knowledge acquisition.
Instruction in the philosophy of science could also include discu.~sions ahout the role
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of trust and the reliance on testimony. Instruction in scientific epistemologies could
inl ..oducc the reliance on testimony as one of the foremost ways of knowing, especially
for scientific knowledge acquisition. Instruction about the nature of scientific knowledge
could inclu('·~ discussions surrounding its consensual nature so that students would
understand that scientific knowledge is held and justified by communities of scientists
rather than individuals. The practice of replication of experiments could be discussed
in a more realistic vein; instead of emphasizing its vlnues in detecting fraUd, replication
could be conveyed as a practice thai, while valued by the scientific community, is rarely
performed.
Thus leaching the nature of science, if it is 10 be conveyed accurately, should
acknowledge the interdependence of scientists and the role of trust and testimony in
scientific knowledge acquisition. The way scientists are perceived by students could
affect decisions they make regarding their future in science. If scientists are portrayed
as being omniscient, experts in all scientific endeavours, or, in the weaker sense, are
portrayed as having the ability to analyze and evaluate any situation that they so choose
by employing ~the scientific method-, students will not only get a false picture of what
scientists are like. but will also be unlikely to think of themselves as capable of
becoming one.
9\
Justificatjons (or Teachjng
the Nature of Science
Teaching the nature of science has often been justified as a means of incrc;L~ing
students' intellectual independence and crilical thinking skills. Howl"vcr. this
justification needs to be rethought. It was concluded in chapter five thai instruction in
the nature of science cannot increase students' intellectual independence wilh rCSfX'Cl Itl
the ability to assess the soundness of many knowledge claims or the competenc)' Ilfthcir
sources. In a very limited way, il can increase students' independence wilh rcsp~..cl In
judging the certainty of scientific knowledge claims and thus make them more disj)lIscd
to think critically about science. However. without the ability 10 think critic:1lly ahuUl
science, this disposition may be counterproductive.
Studenls that are sceptical of scientific knowledge without having any gruunds fur
thcirbelid may become cynical about science and its products (Norris. 1984). Hnltlin&
a tentative view of the products of knowledgc may lead students to distrust or diliTl.ogl.rtl
all scientific knowledge becaU$C Mit is all incorrect and is likely 10 lead us aslnlY·
(Norris, 1984. p. 486).
Hardwig (1991) offers another alternativc. Instead of trying to cnCOUT"clgc a sceptic;.,
attitude towards science, trust in the scientific community and the products of .~cicncc
should be encouraged. In his view, we have no choice bUlla trust, since rcpliclItiun tlf
experiments is rarely performed. He asserts:
An untrusting, suspicious attitude would impede the growth of knowledge, perhaps
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without even substantially reducing the risk of unreliable testimony. Trust in
onc's epistcmic colleagues is not, then, a necessary evil. It is a positive value for
any community of finite minds. provided only that this trusl is not 100 orten
abused. For finitc minds can know many things only through epistemic
cooperation. (Hardwig, 1991, p. 707)
Thus IruSI, and not scepticism. may be more a productive attitude 10 have when it
comes to acquiring scientific knowledge claims. This attitude will be more easily
accepted and encouraged if the trust that is pervasive throughout the scientific
community is portrayed when leaching the nature of science. Students will sec that
scientists and laypcople alike must rely on testimony for much of their knowledge.
Teaching the nature of science may still bejuslified, even Ihoogh it may not increase
studenls' ability to assess the soundness of many scientific knowledge claims that they
may encounter upon leaving school. Instruction in the nature of science that integrates
historical accounts, laboratory approaches, and philosophy of science may increase
students' understanding of the scientific COflCeots and theories that they learn in school
and may be effeclive in promoting conceptual change. II may also be justified as a
means of making science classes more interesting 10 students, and as a means of
attracting more students into science careers. There are many good reasons for
continuing to teach the nature of science. However, fostering intellectual independence
and giving students the ability to think critically about scientific knowledge claims thaI
they encounter upon lcavhg school are not among them.
...
lJll1nl~tiQn in Scientific Ethics
The rarity of replication in science and the reliance on testimony in Sl'icnlifil'
knowledge generation and acquisition leads to an oft-neglected but necessary area fur
instruction: scientific elhi-::s. This would nol be necessary if scicnce wa.~ sclf-rtllkill~:
the lack of emphasis on scientific ethics in science education may be ,hie til lhe
perception Ihal science is self-policed. With insllllclion in the nailire of science thaI
demonstrates the reliance on testimony and the rarity of replicalion in !idelwe must elm!c
instruction in scientific ethics. Hardwig (1991) asserts:
Inability to sec the role of trust in science effcctively destroys our ahility 1U
combat unreliable scientific testimony. II undermincs any attempt to fnrmulalc
and teach research ethics and it stifles any attempt to introduce new deterrents tn
fraud. A fraud-proof institution has no need for additional protection againsl
fraud. (p.707)
By teaching Ihatthe scientific method is a commitment to evidence, as Siegel (IYKJl
suggests, and that scientists are guided by reasons and evidence, instruction in ~ientitic
ethics is not warranted sinCe scientists are secn as confirming all knowlL'tIge clail11.~.
However, as described in chapter threc of this thesis, scientisL~ do nol often replicate
other scientists' work. With the growing interdependence of scienlist.~ due to (CHill
projects, and with scientific knowledge becoming increasingly more complex and bs
likely to be replicated, instruction in scientific ethics is becoming an even grellier
necessity. Science courses should includc objectivcs related to scic-ntific cthics in their
94
curriculum.
Teaching the nature of science has often been justified as a means of increasing
students' intellectual independence and critical thinking skills with respect to scientific
knowledge claims that they may encounter upon leaving school. However, scientists
and students alike arc inescapably cpislcrnically dependent on other scientists for much
of their knowledge. Scientific knowledge acquisition is achieved mostly through the
reliance on the testimony of scientific experts. Analysis of three approaches to teaching
the nattlre of science illustrate that intellectual independence is expected to be achieved
to various degrees. Rcablically, however, the most that could be expected for students
is the last level of independence, that of independence with respect to judging the
certainty of scientific knowledge claims. Critical thinking skills are enhanced to the
extent Ihat students may have a critical disposition towards scientific knowledge if they
hold scientific knowledge to be tentative. However, instruction in the nature of science
docs not give students thc ability 10 think critically about scientific knowledge claims.
Implications for science education includc providing instruction in the nature of science
that acknowledges the role of trust, thc reliance on testimony, and the interdependence
of scientists in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. While students cannot achieve
inlelh,'clual independence from instruction in the nature of science, their awareness of
the reliance on testimony should encourage them to trust the testimony of scientists as
.,
an alternative. Finally, the necessity of InlSI and the reliance on lh~ l~slinlll11Y (If
scientists makes instruction in scientific ethics a necessity in science educatiun.
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